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THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT:
TO THE SPOILED GO THE PRIVILEGES
SCOTT H. HUGHES'

Negotiation, we may say, ought strictly to be viewed simply as a
means to an end; it is the road the parties must travel to arrive at
their goal of a mutually satisfactory settlement. But like other
means, negotiation is easily converted into an end in itself; it
readily becomes a game played... with so little reserve by those
taken up with it that they will sacrifice their own ultimate
interests in order to win it.'
First, consider the case of the Deceiving Defendant:
At the scene of a deadly automobile accident in which the father of
two is killed, the State Police begin to unravel the facts. The driver of
the other car may have been speeding at the time of the accident, but
tire marks are inconclusive. No tickets are issued. Two months later,

the grieving widow seeks the counsel of a young attorney in their small
town who eagerly agrees to take the case. In accordance with the local
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) rule of the District Court, which
requires all parties to utilize some form of ADR prior to filing a lawsuit,
counsel contacts the insurance carrier for the defendant about
scheduling a mediation.
In a cost cutting measure, the insurance company delays turning the
matter over to trial counsel until after a lawsuit has been filed. Instead,
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the manager of the claims department assigns the matter to a young
adjuster who is under pressure to keep loss-payables at a miimum.
Together, the adjuster and the attorney choose a mediator from a list of
certified mediators maintained by the court administrator and set a date
for the mediation.
After completing her opening statement at the start of the
mediation, plaintiff's counsel begins to lay out the case. As to liability,
counsel states that he obtained the opinion of an accident reconstruction
expert, who will state at trial that the defendant was going forty-five
miles per hour (mph) in a thirty-five mph zone just prior to the accident.
At the end of his presentation, he makes an opening demand of
$500,000. The adjuster responds that liability is by no means clear and
that the decedent's employment record does not warrant those excessive
damages. Considering the questionable liability and the amount of
damages, he responds with an offer of $35,000.
The mediator then begins to explore the strengths and weaknesses of
each side's case, but the parties make little progress. After several hours
of mediation, the plaintiff has come down to $350,000 and the defendant
up to $75,000. Finally, the mediator meets in caucus with the adjuster
and asks him to call the company for more authority. After doing so,
the adjuster comes back to general session and says that he has
convinced his supervisors to settle for $100,000, which represents the
limits of liability under the contract of insurance, plus an additional
payment from the defendant personally of $2,500 in return for a full
release. Although disappointed with the lack of adequate coverage, the
widow's counsel reluctantly recommends that she accept the offer.
Nearly destitute and with little prospect of recovering more, the widow
agrees and a settlement agreement is drafted.
Unfortunately, the adjuster lied. About six months after the
settlement, the widow hears a rumor from a friend of a friend that the
adjuster has defrauded her and that policy limits were $250,000, not
$100,000. Somewhat disgruntled by the idea that her attorney did not
know the exact policy limits, she seeks the advice of a top plaintiff's
attorney in the distant state capital. New counsel prepares to file suit
against the insurance company for fraud, but first telephones the
insurance company and sets up the obligatory mediation.
Understandably, the session quickly breaks down after just a few
minutes of acrimonious exchange.
In analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the case, plaintiff's
counsel recognizes that the plaintiff's testimony will be seen as selfserving, thereby reducing the case to a contest of credibility between the

2001]

TO THE SPOILED GO THE PRIVILEGES

two disputants. This would be a coin toss. On the other hand, the
testimony of the mediator will be highly significant to carrying the day
for the plaintiff. When the plaintiff's attorney files the lawsuit on the
heels of the failed mediation, she provides the required list of
prospective witnesses and also issues a subpoena for the mediator's
testimony and notices the defendant.
Prior to the scheduled time for the deposition, attorneys for the
mediator file a motion seeking a protective order to stop the mediator's
deposition, asserting the confidentiality of the mediation process. This
motion is joined by the insurance company which also files a motion in
limine to assert the mediation privilege. The motion seeks a court order
prohibiting the plaintiff from testifying about anything the adjuster said.
Should the subpoena be quashed by the district court preventing the
plaintiff from obtaining this important evidence from the mediator?
Should the plaintiff be prohibited from testifying about what she heard
the adjuster say about the policy limits? Does the need for protecting
the confidentiality of the parties and the institution of mediation
outweigh the needs of the individual who is damaged by the wrongful
conduct of an adverse party?
Under recent case law, both the mediator3 and the plaintiff would
most likely testify.4 Under the statutes of some states, they would
certainly testify;5 however, under others, it is unclear.6 Unfortunately,
3. See Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110,1139 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (creating an
exception for mediators to testify in an action surrounding the enforcement of an agreement
reached in mediation where a party invoked the contract defense of undue influence).
4. See Randle v. Mid GulfA Inc., No. 14-95-01292-CV, 1996 WL 447954, at *1 (Tex. App.
Aug. 8, 1996) (reversing summary judgment in favor of confidentiality where party alleged
coercion in defense to an action to enforce a settlement agreement reached during mediation).
But see generallyPeople v. Snyder, 492 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (quashing District
Attorney's subpoena in criminal proceeding seeking mediation records because the applicable
statute allowed for no exceptions even though arguably the defendant had waived
confidentiality).

5. See IowA CoDE ANN. §679C.2 (West Supp. 2000). This section states:
If a mediation is conducted pursuant to a court order, a court-connected mediation
program, a written agreement between the parties, or a provision of law, all
mediation communications and mediation documents are privileged and
confidential and not subject to disclosure in any judicial or administrative
proceeding except under any of the following circumstances:
6. When a mediation communication or mediation document is relevant to the
legal claims of a party against a mediator or mediation program arising out of a
breach of the legal obligations of the mediator or mediation program.
7. When a mediation communication or mediation document is relevant to
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determining the existence of an agreement that resulted from the mediation or is
relevant to the enforcement of such an agreement.
Id.; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (West Supp. 2001). The statute reads:
B. (1) The parties, counsel, and other participants therein shall not be required to
testify concerning the mediation proceedings and are not subject to process or
subpoena, issued in any judicial or administrative procedure, which requires the
disclosure of any communications or records of the mediation, except with respect to
the following:
(c) A judicial determination of the meaning or enforceability of an agreement
resulting from a mediation procedure if the court determines that testimony
concerning what occurred in the mediation proceeding is necessary to prevent fraud
or manifest injustice.
Id.; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5949 (West 2000). This statute reads:
(a) General rule.-Except as provided in subsection (b), all mediation
communications and mediation documents are privileged. Disclosure of mediation
communications and mediation documents may not be required or compelled
through discovery or any other process....
(b) Exceptions.
(3) The privilege and limitation set forth under subsection (a) does not apply to a
fraudulent communication during mediation that is relevant evidence in an action to
enforce or set aside a mediated agreement reached as a result of that fraudulent
communication.
Id. But see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West Supp. 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
435.014 (West 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 48.109 (Michie Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 919-44 (1997).
6. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-235d (West Supp. 2001). This statute states:
(a) As used in this section, "-emediation" [sic] means a process, or any part of a
process, which is not court-ordered, in which a person not affiliated with either party
to a lawsuit facilitates communication between such parties and, without deciding
the legal issues in dispute or imposing a resolution to the legal issues, which assists
the parties in understanding and resolving the legal dispute of the parties.
(b) Except as provided in this section, by agreement of the parties or in
furtherance of settlement discussions, a person not affiliated with either party to a
lawsuit, an attorney for one of the parties or any other participant in a mediation
shall not voluntarily disclose or, through discovery or compulsory process, be
required to disclose any oral or written communication received or obtained during
the course of a mediation, unless... (4) the disclosure is required as a result of
circumstances in which a court finds that the interest of justice outweighs the need
for confidentiality, consistent with the principles of law.
Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.023(c)(4) (Anderson 1998). This statute reads:
[The privilege or confidentiality does not apply]
[t]o the disclosure of a mediation communication if a court, after a hearing,
determines that the disclosure does not circumvent Evidence Rule 408, that the
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under the terms of the proposed Uniform Mediation Act (UMA), the

mediator would not have to fret about testifying. 7 The secrets of the
Deceiving Defendant would be safe with the mediator. The UMA may
also prevent the plaintiff from testifying about the adjusters statements!
Consider a Slight Variation on the Theme:
As is the case with many court-annexed mediations involving purely
distributive issues, such as personal injury litigation, the mediator
conducts the mediation entirely in caucus after hearing the parties'
opening statements and initial demands. The mediation proceeds by the
mediator shuttling back and forth between the parties, and conveying
offers and demands. By a process which varies from empathetic
listening to barely veiled arm twisting, the parties proceed along the
same path. The only difference is that the adjuster's misrepresentation
about the policy limits is made to the mediator in caucus and not in
general session. The plaintiff learns about the policy limits from the

mediator alone and not from the adjuster. The plaintiff accepts, the
disclosure is necessary in the particular case to prevent a manifest injustice, and that
the necessity for disclosure is of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the importance of
protecting the general requirement of confidentiality in mediation proceedings.
Id.; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 904.085(4)(e) (West Supp. 2000). This statute reads: "In an action or
proceeding distinct from the dispute whose settlement is attempted through mediation, the
court may admit evidence otherwise barred by this section if necessary to prevent a manifest
injustice of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the importance of protecting the principle of
confidentiality in mediation proceedings generally."
7. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 6(b)-(c) (2001) [hereinafter UMA].
Section 6. EXCEPTIONS TO PRIVILEGE.
(b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative agency, or
arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the
proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available,
that there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in
protecting confidentiality, and that the mediation communication is sought or
offered in:
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove a claim
to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the
mediation.
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation
communication referred to in subsection ... (b)(2).
8. Id § 6(b) (creating a hurdle that requires the proponent to show that the need for the
evidence "substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality"); see infra Part II.A.
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settlement agreement is signed, and the parties depart without further
contact.
Now, only the mediator can provide proof of the adjuster's fraud.
The mediator's testimony, once highly significant, has become
absolutely pivotal to the plaintiff's case. Should the mediator testify?
Under the current language of the UMA, the mediator will not have to
testify. Without the mediator's testimony, the adjuster will successfully
perpetrate a fraud on the plaintiff.
Consider a Second Variation on the Theme:
During one of the early caucuses with the adjuster, the mediator
looks down at the table upon which the adjuster's file is spread.
Something catches her eye-something highlighted in the corner of the
file. Not intending to pry, she immediately averts her eyes, but not
before realizing what she has seen: the policy limits are $250,000. Only
later, when the adjuster offers to settle for policy limits of $100,000, does
she realize the significance of what she saw earlier in the mediation.
The adjuster is lying. Does the mediator confront the adjuster?
Assume for a moment that she does, but the adjuster fails to come clean,
what does she do now? Does she terminate the mediation and, if so,
upon what foundation does she act? Has the self-determination of the
parties been fatally compromised?
Compare this with the first hypothetical in which the mediator was
unaware of the real policy limits and the fraudulent conduct. A
mediator acts inconsistently if she terminates the mediation in this
context to prevent fraud, but then refuses to testify in a later trial to set
aside a settlement agreement where the adjuster successfully defrauded
the plaintiff by misrepresenting the policy limits. Does terminating the
mediation in one instance, and refusing to testify in the other, reward
the stealthy liar? Does it provide impetus for mediators concerned with
their settlement rates to "bury" any improprieties?
Next, consider the case of the Negligent Neutral:
After months of squabbling, two partners trying to split up their rare
and ancient art business reluctantly succumb to the urging of the
company's accountant and attempt mediation. In the early stages of the
mediation, while trying to get a handle of the value of the various
components of the business, the mediator states, "I am not a tax lawyer,
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but doesn't this issue on taxes have some value that could be considered
in your division of assets?"
"We hadn't thought of that," both partners chime in.
"Now, you should confirm this with your attorneys, but I think it's
worth using," the mediator confirms.
The partners work all day long while the bargaining becomes
increasingly contentious. Late into the evening they work. Patience is
running thin and tempers are frayed. The parties, and the mediator, are
obviously exhausted. Many issues have been addressed, but the two are
split over a prized Grecian urn. Although it has a value of $20,000, the
parties have held it as a hallmark of their business since shortly after
they first opened their doors. Each refuses to give up their claim to it.
The mediator, trying to break the dam, mentions the tax issue again, but
fails to attach his previous admonition about seeking a separate opinion.
"All right, all right, if you give me the tax break, you can have it." Near
tears, one of the partners continues, "That urn is so special, but I can use
the $30,000 tax break to help care for my mother. I think she has
Alzheimers." After another two hours of drafting, an agreement is
signed at 1:00 a.m. before the parties leave the mediation.
Unfortunately, the mediator is wrong and no such tax incentive
exists. After the parties learn the truth, the disgruntled partner sues to
void the agreement and recover the Grecian urn under the theory of
mutual mistake of the law. As an alternative remedy, the plaintiff's
attorney joins the mediator as a co-defendant alleging malpractice
arising from the negligent opinion about the tax incentive. As expected,
counsel for both the other partner and the mediator assert the
mediation privilege and move to dismiss the petition.9 Should the
confidentiality afforded the mediation process prevent the disgruntled
partner from her day in court?
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past three decades, the United States has experienced a
remarkable growth in the use of mediationi' as a method of resolving
9. See generally Future Plastics, Inc. v. Ware Shoals Plastics, Inc., 407 F.2d 1042, 1046 (4th
Cir. 1969) (supporting the common law principle of mutual mistake of the law).
10. Definitions of mediation run from simple and straight forward to complex. See; eg.,
KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 23 (1994) (Mediation is
"simply the facilitation of a settlement between individuals."); KARL A. SLAiKEu, WHEN PUSH
COMES TO SHOVE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MEDIATING DISPUTES xiii (1996) ("In its simplest
form, mediation is a proess through which a third party assists two or more others in working out
their own solution to a conflict."); CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS:
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disputes. From community settings to court-annexed programs, from

matters in small claims courts to huge, multi-party disputes involving
complicated issues of public policy, parties increasingly find help from

third parties." Accompanying this growth in the use of mediation, we
have witnessed a parallel proliferation of statutes throughout the
country containing provisions relating to mediation. As of 1994, the
legislatures of the several states and the federal government had enacted
PRACrICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICr 14 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter THE
MEDIATION PROCESS] ("[M]ediation is the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an
acceptable... third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist disputing
parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in dispute.");
UMA, supra note 7, § 2(1) ("'Mediation' means a process in which a mediator facilitates
communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement
regarding their dispute."). Each of these definitions contains imbedded values and assumptions
about public policy, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this paper. See also JAY
FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING

CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 7 (1984) ("[Mediation] can be defined as the process by
which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically
isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual
settlement that will accommodate their needs."); ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P.
FOLGER,

THE

PROMISE

OF

MEDIATION:

RESPONDING

TO

CONFLICT

THROUGH

EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 2 (1994) ("[Mjediation is generally understood... as an
informal process in which a neutral third party with no power to impose a resolution helps the
disputing parties try to reach a mutually acceptable settlement."); AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1995), available at

http://www.adr.org/rules/ethics/standard.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2001) [hereinafter MODEL
STANDARDS] ("Mediation is a process in which an impartial third party-a mediator-facilitates
the resolution of a dispute by promoting voluntary agreement.... A mediator facilitates
communications, promotes understanding, focuses the parties on their interests, and seeks
creative problem solving to enable the parties to reach their own agreement.").
11. NCCUSL, DRAFT UMA, at Prefatory Note (September 2001) [hereinafter
SEPTEMBER 2001 DRAFT]. All citations to the UMA will refer to the final version of the
UMA that is printed in full in the pages that follow within this edition of the Marquette Law
Review. However, since the final version of the Prefatory Note and Reporter's Notes was not
completed at the time of publication, all citations to these Notes were taken from the
September 2001 Draft of the UMA. The Prefatory Note begins:
During the last thirty years the use of mediation has expanded beyond its centurylong home in collective bargaining to become an integral and growing part of the
processes of dispute resolution in the courts, public agencies, community dispute
resolution programs, and the commercial and business communities, as well as
among private parties engaged in conflict.
Id. See generally THE MEDIATION PROCESS, supra note 10, at 22-23 (providing
additional background information).
12. NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE §
13.01 (2d ed. 1994); see also Michael B. Getty et al., Preface to Symposium on Drafting a
Uniform/Model Mediation Act, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 787, 788'(1998) (referring to the
growth of mediation occurring over the last fifteen years).
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2000 statutes, more than double the number from five years prior.
Although 1994 is the last year for which there are actual statistics,
estimates now raise the number of statutes with provisions affecting
mediation to 2500."4 When all of the court rules, agency regulations,

executive orders, and court decisions are added together, it becomes
clear that the body of law in this field is growing dramatically. 5
Many early statutes accommodated special interests. Examples
include an Iowa mediation program in which lenders were mandated to
use mediation prior to foreclosing secured agricultural debt," a public
works mediation act in New Mexico," and legislation for mediation of
disputes involving Native American burial sites in Nevada.'8 Other acts
created regimes for mediation of mobile home park disputes in
Colorado, 9 radioactive waste management difficulties in New
Hampshirey complaints arising from dental work in Oklahoma, 21 and
more.2 California alone has forty-two statutes covering forty-two
specific subjects for mediation including truancy,' regulation of
pesticides,24 gangs,25 and Native American historical and sacred sites,'
among others.27 Additionally, nearly half of the states have now passed
13. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 12, § 13.01.
14. SEFrEMBER 2001 DRAFT, supra note 11, at Prefatory Note, § 2.
15. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 12, § 13.01.
16. IOWA CODE ANN. § 654.2C (West 1995) (originally enacted in 1986).
17. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4C-1 (Michie 1997) (originally enacted in 1992).
18. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 383.160 (Michie 1999) (originally enacted in 1989).
19. COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-216 (West 2000) (originally enacted in 1981).
20. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-G:16(II)(k) (1996) (originally enacted in 1986).
21. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 328.60 (West 2000) (originally enacted in 1991).
22. See, eg., CAL. GOVT CODE § 12980(i) (West 2001) (housing discrimination) (originally
enacted in 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-506.53 (West 1999) (housing discrimination)
(originally enacted in 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-36(e) (1990) (fair employment) (originally
enacted in 1978); 775 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 517B-102(E)(3) (West 1993) (human rights)
(originally enacted in 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4332 (1997) (labor) (originally enacted in
1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4555 (Supp 2000) (landlord/tenant) (originally enacted in 1986);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.015(5) (West 1998) (divorce); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 6B-2-4(r)
(Michie 2000) (public ethics and fair housing) (originally enacted in 1989); WIs. STAT. §
767.11(12) (2000) (family court) (originally enacted in 1987).
23. See CAL EDUC CODE § 48263.5 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 601.3 (West 1998).
24. See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 13127,13146 (West 2001).
25. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13826.6 (West 2000).
26. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5097.94 (West 1984).
27. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 129 (West 1990) (complaints about licentiates), § 465
(West 1990) (community dispute resolution), § 6086.14 (West Supp. 2001) (attorney discipline), §
6200 (West 2001) (attorney's fees); CAL. CIV. CODE § 852 (West Supp. 2001) (rights and
obligations of owners), § 1354 (West Supp. 2001) (property disputes); CAL Civ. PROC- CODE §
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This trend has

been encouraged by the development of programs in which the courts
refer cases directly to court-annexed mediation programs.'
This rapid proliferation has been accompanied by many mediation
statutes that are poorly worded,30 unclear,3' incomplete,32 or internally
1297.301 (West Supp. 2001) (encouragement of settlement), § 1775 (West Supp. 2001) (civil
action); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56500.3 (West Supp. 2000) (special education disputes); CAL FAM.
CODE § 3161-3162 (West 1994 & Supp. 2001) (child custody); CAL FISH & GAME CODE § 1017
(West 1998) (fish and wildlife resources); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 4202 (West 2001)
(agricultural associations), § 13146 (West 2001) (water contamination), § 52332 (West 2001) (seed
regulation), § 54451 (West 2001) (agricultural cooperatives), § 57031 (West 2001) (produce
unloaders), § 58036 (West 1997) (agricultural producers and distributors); CAL GOVT CODE §
3505.2 (West 1995) (public agencies and employees), § 3518 (West 1995) (governor and employee
organizations), § 12980(i) (West 2001) (housing discrimination), § 66031 (West 1997) (land use
disputes); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25199.4 (West 1992) (hazardous waste control);
CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.75 (West Supp. 2001) (insurance disputes); CAL. LAB. CODE § 65 (West
1989 & Supp. 2001) (labor mediation), § 1137.1 (West 1989) (public transit employees), § 1155.3
(West 1989) (agricultural employees), § 2680.5 (West 1989) (garment manufacturing); CAL. PUB.
UTIL CODE § 100304 (West 1991) (Santa Clara County transit), § 103404 (West 1991) (San
Mateo County transit), § 120478 (West 1991) (transit development board), § 125524 (West 1991)
(North San Diego County transit), § 130371 (West 1991) (county transportation commission);
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 5308 (West 1986) (welfare eligibility); CAL VEH. CODE § 3050 (West
2000) (motor vehicle dealer licensure); CAL. WATER CODE § 1219 (West Supp. 2001) (water
rights).
28. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (West 1994) (originally enacted in 1993); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-7-201 to -207 (Michie 1997) (originally enacted in 1979); CAL EVmD. CODE §§
1119-28 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001) (originally enacted in 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679C.2(4)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2001) (originally enacted in 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (West
Supp. 2001) (originally enacted in 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 2000)
(originally enacted in 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 2000) (originally enacted in 1967);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992) (originally enacted in 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2914
(1995) (originally enacted in 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 48.109(3) (Michie 1996) (originally
enacted in 1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:23A-9 (West 2000) (originally enacted in 1987); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 1998) (originally enacted in 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §
1805 (1998) (originally enacted in 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.220 (1999) (originally enacted in
1997); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5949 (West 2000) (originally enacted in 1996); RI. GEN.
LAWS § 9-19-44 (1998) (originally enacted in 1992); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 19-13-32 (Michie
2000) (originally enacted in 1998); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.053(c) (Vernon
1997) (originally enacted in 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.10 (Michie 2000) (originally
enacted in 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070 (West 1995) (originally enacted in 1993);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 904.085(4)(a) (West 2000) (originally enacted in 1985); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 143-103 (Michie 1996) (originally enacted in 1991).
29. See, e.g., AR17. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-413 (West 2000); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1730
(West Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-305 (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 46b-53a, -59a (West 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-23-1 to -12 (1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
4, § 18-B (West Supp. 2000).
30. See, eg., CAL EVID. CODE § 1152 (West 1995); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1115(b), 1122(b)
(West Supp. 2001) (definition of mediator § 1115 refers, in part, to "a neutral person" and §
1122(b) cites to "a neutral person" without invoking the defined term "mediator"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Anderson 1998); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2317.02.3 (Anderson 1998);
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Further, substantial discrepancies exist between acts

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.22 (Anderson 1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.05.2
(Anderson 2000) (containing lengthy and confusing provisions regarding the scope of
confidentiality and applicable exceptions).
31. See, eg., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (West 1994) (containing a definition of
"mediation communication" but not using the term); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-22-302(4)
(West 1997) ("'Mediator' means a trained individual who assists disputants to reach a mutually
acceptable resolution of their disputes by identifying and evaluating alternatives.") (emphasis
added). The inclusion of "evaluation of alternatives" may mean that facilitative and
transformative mediators are not mediating nor are protected by the act. MO. ANN. STAT. §
435.014 (West 1992) (containing a definition of "mediation communication" but not using the
term); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2914 (1995) (containing a definition of "mediation communication"
but not using the term); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805 (West 1993) (containing a definition of
"mediation communication" but not using the term); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (Michie 1997)
(containing a definition of "mediation communication" but not using the term); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 19-13-32 (Michie Supp. 2000) (containing a definition of "mediation communication" but
not using the term); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7 (2000) (containing a definition of "mediation
communication" but not using the term); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-576.10, -581.22 (Michie 2000)
(containing a definition of "mediation communication" but not using the term); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN § 5.60.070 (West 1995) (containing a definition of "mediation communication" but
not using the term); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 904.085 (West 2000) (containing a definition of
"mediation communication" but not using the term).
32. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-302(4) (West 1997) (stating that "'[m]ediator'
means a trained individual," but not defining the term "trained" in the act) (emphasis added);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206 (Michie 1999) (lacking a definition of mediation); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:4112 (West Supp. 2001) (lacking a definition of mediation); ME. RULES OF COURT Rule
408 (West 2000) (lacking a definition of mediation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 2000)
(lacking a definition of mediation); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992) (lacking a definition
of mediation); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2914 (1995) (lacking a definition of mediation); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. 48.109 (Michie 1996) (lacking a definition of mediation); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§
2A:23A-9 (West 2000) (lacking a definition of mediation), -13 (West 2000) (lacking a definition of
mediation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (Michie Supp. 2000) (lacking a definition of
mediation); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070 (lacking a definition of mediation), § 5.60.072
(West 1995) (lacking a definition of mediation); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103 (Michie 1996)
(lacking a definition of mediation).
33. See, eg., ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (West 1994) (structuring "confidentiality"
apparently as a privilege, an evidentiary exclusion, and a testimonial privilege; if a privilege, the
statute is unclear if the parties or the mediator hold the privilege); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206
(Michie 1999) (structuring "confidentiality" apparently as both a privilege and an evidentiary
exclusion); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1115-1126 (West Supp. 2001) (structuring "confidentiality"
apparently as a privilege, an evidentiary exclusion, and a testimonial incapacity, if a privilege, the
statute is unclear if the parties or the mediator hold the privilege). But see Olam v. Cong.
Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding that a mediator holds a separate
privilege); ME. R. COURT Rule 408 (West 2000) (structuring "confidentiality" apparently as both
a privilege and as a confidential negotiation under Rule 408); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West
2000) (structuring "confidentiality" apparently as both a privilege and a testimonial incapacity);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992) (structuring "confidentiality" apparently as a privilege, an
evidentiary exclusion, and a confidential negotiation; if a privilege, the statute is unclear if the
parties or the mediator hold the privilege); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2914 (1995) (structuring
"confidentiality" apparently as a privilege, an evidentiary exclusion, and a confidential
negotiation under Rule 408); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 48.109 (Michie 1996) (structuring
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within the same state purporting to accomplish similar goals.' Thus, it is

not hard to imagine both the vast differences that exist in the mediation
schemes from state to state and the problems that these differences may
present.
Inconsistently worded statutes create the most difficulty when
applying privileges to disputes mediated in one state and subsequently
litigated in another. In these situations, whose law of confidentiality
applies? Should the forum state apply the rule of privilege from the
mediation state or its own rule when determining what, if any,
mediation communications should be admitted?

The most troubling

scenario involves communications made during mediation in one
jurisdiction which provides for confidentiality, but which may not be
protected in the forum state. Under the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, the evidence would "be admitted unless there is some
special reason why the forum policy favoring admission should not be
given effect."35 In the absence of such a showing, parties mediating in a
jurisdiction

with

extensive

protections

and

few

exceptions

to

confidentiality may later be compelled to testify in another state which
offers such protections. 6
"confidentiality" apparently as a privilege, an evidentiary exclusion, and a confidential
negotiation; if a privilege, the statute is unclear if the parties or the mediator hold the privilege);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.220, 36.222 (1999) (structuring "confidentiality" apparently as both a
privilege and an evidentiary exclusion); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (Michie 1995)
(structuring "confidentiality" apparently as a privilege, an evidentiary exclusion, and a
confidential negotiation under Rule 408); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-7 (2000) (structuring
"confidentiality" apparently as both a privilege and an evidentiary exclusion); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
904.085 (West 2000) (structuring "confidentiality" apparently as both a privilege and an
evidentiary exclusion).
34. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5 (West 1995) (stating rule in terms of competency), §
1119 (West Supp. 2001) (written as an exclusionary rule). But see Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1132
(concluding that the California Court of Appeals in Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d
464 (1998), viewed the two provisions as " analytically redundant").
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 139(2) (1971). In determining
whether or not to give effect to the policy of the forum and allow admission, the court should
consider four factors: "(1) the number and nature of the contacts that the state of the forum has
with the parties and with the transaction involved, (2) the relative materiality of the evidence that
is sought to be excluded, (3) the kind of privilege involved and (4) fairness to the parties." Id. at
cmt. d; see also Joshua P. Rosenberg, Note, Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation
Privilegeand Conflict of Laws, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 157,168-71 (1994).
36. Compare LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (West Supp. 2001) (containing an exception to
determine "the meaning or enforceability of an agreement... [if] necessary to prevent fraud or
manifest injustice") with CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115-26 (West Supp. 2001) (containing no such
exception); compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (Michie 2000) (containing an exception for
claims against the mediator) with IOWA CODE ANN. § 679C.2 (West 1998) (containing no such
exception).
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In an effort to address these problems, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the Dispute
Resolution Section of the American Bar Association (ABA) engaged in
a unique, joint effort to draft a Uniform Mediation Act.' Founded
more than a century ago, NCCUSL's stated purpose is to "promote
uniformity in the law among the states on subjects as to which
uniformity is desirable and practicable."'' No law student graduates
from the nation's law schools without some exposure to the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), the grandparent of all uniform acts in the
United States, originally adopted by NCCUSL.39 Composed of unpaid
commissioners appointed from all fifty states, Washington, D.C., and
Puerto Rico, 40 NCCUSL does not enact legislation, but adopts proposed
uniform acts after extensive research and deliberation. After adoption,
the commissioners then urge passage of the various acts by their
in order to "promote uniformity" throughout the
respective legislatures
41
United States.
NCCUSL has had a long and close relationship with the ABA,
growing out of an 1889 decision by the ABA "to work for uniformity of
' Despite their close ties, the
the laws through voluntary state action."42
two organizations had never collaborated so closely as when they agreed
in 1998 to create two Drafting Committees to work jointly on drafting a
37. SEPTEMBER 2001 DRAFT, supra note 11, at Prefatory Note § 4. The document explains
that:
The Mediation Act results from an historic collaboration. The Uniform Law
Commission Drafting Committee, chaired by Judge Michael Getty, was joined in the
drafting of this Act by a Drafting Committee sponsored by the American Bar
Association, working through its Section of Dispute Resolution, which was cochaired by former American Bar Association President Roberta Cooper Ramo ...
and Chief Justice Thomas Moyer of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Id. At the time this Article went to press, the UMA had been adopted by NCCUSL at its annual
meeting. The Act awaits review by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association at
its mid-year meeting scheduled for February 2002.

38. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIsSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEEING IN ITS ONE
HUNDRED THIRD YEAR 1275 (1994) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
39. See James J. Brudney, Mediation and Some Lessons from the Uniform State Law
Experience,13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 795,795 (1998).
40. Id. at 797. Each commissioner must be a member of their respective bar. Id. Further,
each state determines the method of selection, number of commissioners, and tenure. Id. at n.9.
41. HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 1278-79.
42. Brudney, supra note 39, at 796 (citing WALTER P. ARMSTRONG JR., A CENTURY OF
SERviE: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF

UNIFORM STATE LAWS 18 (1991)).
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UMA. 43 The NCCUSL 4 and the ABA 45 Drafting Committees have a

few interlocking members46 and have deliberated jointly throughout the
entire process of drafting the UMA. Also, the two Drafting Committees
received advice from leading academicians from across the nation.4
Ultimately, members of the mediation community (from leading
professional and provider organizations) have participated in the
meetings of the Drafting Committees and provided extensive and
extremely influential input.' At the time this Article was going to press,
the Drafting Committees had completed their work and the Act had

been adopted by NCCUSL at their annual meeting in August 2001. The
43. Getty et al., supra note 12, at 787-88.
44. SEPTEMBER 2001 DRAFt, supra note 11. Members of the NCCUSL Drafting
Committee include: The Honorable Michael B. Getty, Judge (Ret.), Chicago, Illinois, Chair;,
Phillip Carroll, Little Rock, Arkansas; Jose Feliciano, Cleveland, Ohio, American Bar
Association Member, Stanley'M. Fisher, Cleveland, Ohio, Enactment Coordinator;, Roger C.
Henderson, Tucson, Arizona, Committee on Style Liason; Elizabeth Kent, Honolulu, Hawaii;
Richard C. Reuben, Columbia, Missouri, Associate Reporter, Nancy H. Rogers, Columbus,
Ohio, National Conference Reporter;, Frank E.A. Sander, Cambridge, Massachusetts, American
Bar Association Member; Byron D. Sher, Sacramento, California; Martha L. Walters, Eugene,
Oregon; and Joan Zeldon, Washington, D.C. Ex officio members include: John L
McClaugherty, Charleston, West Virginia, President of NCCUSL and Leon M. McCorkle, Jr.,
Dublin Ohio, Division Chair of NCCUSL. Id.
45. Id. Members of the ABA Drafting Committee include: The Honorable Chief Justice
Thomas J. Moyer, Columbus, Ohio, Co-Chair; Roberta Cooper Ramo, Albuquerque, New
Mexico, Co-Chair; The Honorable Michael B. Getty, Judge (Ret.), Chicago, Illinois, NCCUSL
Representative; The Honorable Chief Judge Annice M. Wagner, Washington, D.C.; James Diggs,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Jose Feliciano, Cleveland, Ohio; Richard C. Reuben, Columbia,
Missouri, Reporter;, Nancy H. Rogers, Columbus, Ohio, Coordinator, Faculty Advisory
Committee; Judith Saul, Ithaca, New York; Frank E.A. Sander, Cambridge, Massachusetts. l
46. Compare supra note 44 with supra note 45. Individuals serving on both committees
include: The Honorable Michael B. Getty, Judge (Ret.), Jose Feliciano, Frank E.A. Sander, and
Nancy H. Rogers.
47. SEPTEMBER2001 DRAFt, supra note 11, at Prefatory Note § 4. Institutions represented
include: Bowdoin College in Maine and the law schools from Harvard University, University of
Missouri-Columbia, Ohio State University, Pennsylvania State University, University of Texas,
and University of Washington. lId
48. Id. Organizations sending representatives to the meeting of the Drafting Committees
have included the Association for Conflict Resolution, formerly the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution; National Council of Dispute Resolution Professional Organizations;
American Arbitration Association; JAMS/Endispute; Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service; CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution; Academy of Family Mediators; National
Association of Family and Community Mediators; Academy of Mediators; and the California
Dispute Resolution Council. Although not representing provider organizations, other observers
to the Drafting Committees included these sections of the American Bar Association:
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, Labor and Employment Law, Litigation, and the
Senior Lawyer Division. Finally, other observers included representatives of the American Trial
Lawyers Association, Equal Employment Advisory Council, International Academy of
Mediators, and the Society of Professional Journalists. Id.
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House of Delegates of the ABA will most likely consider the UMA at
its mid-year meeting in February 2002 where approval is anticipated.

Although the overall goal of NCCUSL is to promote the uniformity
of mediation laws among the states, the Committees' specific intent was
to act consistently with the public policies of the states. As illustrated by
the Prefatory Note to the September 2001 draft of the UMA, the Act
seeks to assure three fundamental obligations: (1) "the reasonable
expectations of participants regarding confidentiality...[,]j 4 (2) the
fairness and integrity of the mediation process, ° and (3) the selfdetermination of the parties."'

The drafters have more than fulfilled the expectations regarding
confidentiality. Unfortunately, they have done so in a manner that will
result in damage to the long term integrity of the mediation process.
Further, by far surpassing the expectations of confidentiality, the UMA
creates degrees of secrecy that will destroy the self-determination of the

parties in crucial, and unacceptable, circumstances.
This Article will analyze two short, but significant, provisions of the
UMA which cause the most difficulty. Both of these provisions relate to

49. I,-at Prefatory Note § 1 ("In particular, the law has the unique capacity to assure that
the reasonable expectations of participants regarding the confidentiality of the mediation process
are met, rather than frustrated.... Candor during mediation is encouraged by maintaining the
parties' and mediators' expectations regarding confidentiality of mediation communications.").
Id.
50. Id. The Prefatory Note continues:
Because the privilege makes it more difficult to offer evidence to challenge the
settlement agreement, the drafters viewed the issue of confidentiality as tied to
provisions that will help increase the likelihood that the mediation process will be
fair. Fairness is enhanced if it will be conducted with integrity ....
The Act promotes the integrity of the mediation process by suggesting model
provisions that require the mediator to disclose conflicts of interest and be candid
about qualifications.
Id.
51. Ia
In some limited ways, the law can also encourage the use of mediation as part of the
policy to promote the private resolution of disputes through informed selfdetermination.
Self-determination is encouraged by provisions that limit the potential for coercion
of the parties to accept settlements ...and that allow parties to have counsel or
other support persons present during the mediation session." Id.
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exceptions to the mediation privilege contained in the UMA.52 The
structure and content of these two exceptions to mediation
confidentiality speak volumes about the inability of the drafters to
balance the means of confidentiality and the ends of self-determination.
Part II provides a short explanation of confidentiality and privileges.
Part III addresses these two exceptions to the mediation privilege and
Part IV analyzes confidentiality in mediation, self-determination of the
parties, and the conflict between the two.
II. A SHORT EXPLANATION OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGES

Before discussing "the reasonable expectations of participants
regarding the confidentiality of the mediation process," 53 it is necessary
to understand the term "confidentiality"' as used in the context of
mediation.
Confidentiality is constructed from two distinct, but

intertwined

principles which arise

out of certain professional

56
55
relationships such as: attorney-client, clergy-penitent, doctor-patient,5

52. UMA, supranote 7, § 6. Section 6 states:
Section 6. EXCEPTIONS TO PRIVILEGE.
(a) There is no privilege under Section 4 for a mediation communication that is:
(5) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional
misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator; or
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), sought or offered to prove or
disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against
a mediation party, nonparty participant, or representative of a party based on
conduct occurring during a mediation;
(b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative agency, or
arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the
proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available,
that there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in
protective confidentiality, and that the mediation communication is sought or
offered in:
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove a claim
to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the
mediation.
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation
communication referred to in subsection (a)(6) or (b)(2).
Id.

53. SEPTEMBER2001

DRAFr, supranote 11, at Prefatory Note § 1.
54. Id.
55. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 91 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK].
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and now, mediator-disputant."

Confidentiality represents, first, a

positive duty not to disclose secret communications and, second, the

freedom to refuse to answer questions in court.
A. Confidentiality:The Duty to Keep Secrets

Confusingly, the obligation to keep secrets is also referred to as a
duty of confidentiality. For instance, Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct for attorneys is entitled, "Confidentiality of
' and imposes on the attorney an ethical duty not to
Information,"59
divulge, among other things,6 the contents of confidential
communications with a client to others (whether it is the opposing side,
the local newspaper, or the neighbor). 1
A confidential relationship may arise in a formal, professional

56. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 506.04 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE].
57. MCCORMICK, supra note 55, § 101.
58. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1557 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44
(1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 254-58.2 (Michie 1999); see also Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley,

Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principlefor Truly Educated Decisionmaking,74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 826 (1999) ("Unlike physicians and attorneys, who owe a direct
fiduciary duty to their patients and clients, respectively, the mediator is said to represent the
integrity of the mediation process and it is in this sense then that the mediator has a special
fiduciary relationship with both parties to a dispute."); John P. McCrory, Environmental
Mediation-AnotherPiece for the Puzzle, 6 VT. L. REV. 49, 54 (1981) ("It is essential that a
mediator have a confidential relationship with the parties to the dispute."); Michelle D. Gaines, A
Proposed Conflict of Interest Rule for Attorney-Mediators, 73 WASH. L. REV. 699, 710 (1998)
("The court supported this choice by arguing that, in terms of confidentiality and trust, the
relationship between mediator and party is more closely related to the attorney-client relationship
than to the relationship between judge and litigant.") (citing McKenzie Constr. v. St. Croix
Storage Corp., 961 F. Supp. 857,861,863 (D.V.I. 1997); Arthur A. Chaykin, MediatorLiability:A
New Role for Fiduciary Dutiesl 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 731, 742-744 (1984). Mediators have a
fiduciary relationship with the parties based upon the confidentiality of the relationship, the need
for full disclosure by the parties, and the "justifiable trust" that the parties place in the mediator.
Id. at 744.
59. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.6 (1995)
[hereinafter MODEL RULES].
60. Id. at cmt. 5 ("The confidentiality rule applies not merely to matters communicated in
confidence by the client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its
source.").
61. Id. R. 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client
unless a client consents after consultation .... "). See generally CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER &
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACIICE UNDER THE RULES § 5.13 (2d ed. 1999)
("Confidentiality is preserved only if the subsequent disclosure is limited to other persons within
the circle of privilege.").
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relationship as a matter of law,62 including: physician-patient, 6 clergypenitent,6'
accountant-client,6s
realtor-client, 66 architect-client,'
62. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1962); Liebergesell v. Evans, 613
P.2d 1170, 1176 (Wash. 1980) ("A fiduciary relationship arises as a matter of law between an
attorney and his client or a doctor and his patient, for example."). The confidential relationship
may arise as a matter of fact in others. See Indermill v. United Say., 451 N.E.2d 538, 541 (Ohio
App. 1982) ("A confidential relationship is one in which one person comes to rely on and trust
another in his important affairs and the relations there involved are not necessarily legal, but may
be moral, social, domestic or merely personal.") (quoting Taylor v. Shields, 111 N.E.2d 594 (Ohio
App. 1951)); Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.
1992); Adickes v. Andreoli, 600 S.W.2d 939, 946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). "A confidential
relationship may arise not only from the technical relationships, but may also arise informally
from moral, social, domestic, or purely personal relationships." Id. (citing Thigpen v. Locke, 363
S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1962)); see also Roy Ryden Anderson, The Wolf at the Campfire: Understanding
ConfidentialRelationships,53 SMU L. REV. 315,316 (2000).
63. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS AND CURRENT
OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 5.05 (1998) ("The
information disclosed to a physician during the course of the relationship between physician and
patient is confidential to the greatest possible degree .... The physician should not reveal
confidential communications or information without the express consent of the patient, unless
required to do so by law."); see also STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 799 (26th ed. 1995)
(stating the Hippocratic Oath as: "All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my
profession or outside of my profession or in daily commerce with men, which ought not to be
spread abroad, I will keep secret and will never reveal."); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
793 P.2d 479,488-90 (Cal. 1990) (en banc); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726,736 (Tenn. 1998);
Charles E. Cantu & Margaret H. Jones Hopson, Bitter Medicine"A CriticalLook at the Mental
Health Care Provider'sDuty to Warn in Texas, 31 ST. MARY'S LJ. 359, 404 (2000). But see
generally Alissa R. Spielberg, Online Without a Net Physician-PatientCommunication by
Electronic Mail 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 267, 285 (1999) ("As others [sic] commentators and
legislators have pointed out, the current medical system cannot adequately sustain the special
confidential relationship between physician and patient.").
64. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1995); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1034 (West 1995); CONN. GEN
STAT. ANN. § 52-146b (West 1991); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909 (Supp. 2000); GA. CODE
ANN. § 24-9-22 (1995); 735 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-803 (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 3446-3-1 (Michie 1998); LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 403 (West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2156 (West 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1995);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4505 (Consol. 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.02 (Anderson 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 19-13-16 (Michie 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060 (West 1995); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-10a (Michie 1999). See generally Ronald J.
Colombo, Note, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 73
N.Y.U. L. REv. 225, 230-232 (1998); Julie A. Sippel, Comment, Priest-PenitentPrivilege
Statutes: Dual Protectionin the Confessional,43 CATH. U. L. REV. 1127,1130-1133 (1994).
65. See MD. CODE ANN., Cms. & JUD. PROC § 9-110 (1998); AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS,

CODE

OF

PROF'L

CONDUCT

R.

301

(1990),

available

at

http:llwww.aicpa.orglaboutlcode/et3Ol.htm (last visited July 12, 2001) ("A member in public
practice shall not disclose any confidential client information without the specific consent of the
client.").
66. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS, CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE § 1-9 (2000), available at homesnj.com/ethics.htm (last visited July 12, 2001)
("Realtors[] shall not knowingly, during or following the termination of professional relationships
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psychiatrist-patient,6s

nurse-patient 69

and

psychologist-patient70

relationships. On the other hand, the common business relationship is
the antithesis of the confidential relationship, even if there has been a
long standing, cordial relationship. In such a relationship, it is
anticipated that each party will put their own interests as primary and
not subjugate them to the other.7'
A confidential relationship arises when an individual justifiably
places his or her trust in an agent, expecting the agent to place the
principal's interest above his or her own,' and the agent accepts the
responsibility "to advise, counsel, and protect the weaker party."' For
many professions, the duty of confidentiality is imposed upon members
of the respective professions by codes of ethics74 or by statutes.75 Besides
creating a cause of action for breach of the duty, failing to fulfill the
obligation of confidentiality may cause the imposition of penalties such
with their clients: 1) reveal confidential information of [their] clients .. ").
67. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECrS, CODE OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr R. 3.401 (1997), available at http'//www.e-architect.com/institute/codeethics.asp.
("Members shall not knowingly disclose information that would adversely affect their client or
that they have been asked to maintain in confidence, except as otherwise allowed or required by
this Code or applicable law.").
68. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE ON
THEPRINCIPLESOFMEDICALETHICS § 4 (1995).
69. AMERICAN NURSES ASSOCIATION, CODE FOR NURSES § 2 (1985) ("The nurse
safeguards the client's right to privacy by judiciously protecting information of a confidential
nature.").
70. See AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS
AND
CODE OF CONDUCr
§ 5.02
(1992),
available at
httpJ/vwrww.apa.org/ethics/code.html (last visited July 12, 2001) ("Psychologists have a primary
obligation and take reasonable precautions to respect the confidentiality rights of those with
whom they work or consult, recognizing that confidentiality may be established by law,
institutional rules, or professional or scien-tific [sicl relationships.").
71. Anderson, supranote 62, at 353-54.
72- See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACIS § 472 cmt. c (1932) ("A fiduciary

position.., includes not only the position of one who is a trustee, executor, administrator, or the
like, but that of agent, attorney, trusted business adviser, and indeed any person whose relation
with another is such that the latter justifiably expects his welfare to be cared for by the former.").
73. See Swerhun v. Gen. Motors Corp., 812 F. Supp. 1218, 1223 (M.D. Fla. 1993); see also
United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd in parton othergrounds,773
F.2d 477 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The mere unilateral investment of confidence by one party in the other
ordinarily will not suffice to saddle the parties with the obligations and duties of a confidential
relationship."); see also CODE OF ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CHARTERED LIFE
UNDERWRTERS & CHARTERED FINANCIAL CONSULTANTS § I.I(B), available at

httpl/csep.iit.edu/codes/col/asclu-a.htm (last visited July 17, 2001) ("In a conflict of interest
situation the interest of the client must be paramount.").
74. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
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as censure or expulsion from a professional organization, or, in a
regulatory setting, license suspension or revocation. 6
Within mediation, the scope of the duty to keep secrets may be
treated differently from other professional relationships where the duty
rests upon the professional only and not on the client or patient. For
instance, within the attorney-client relationship, the client is free to
disclose to others whatever took place during her conferences with her
attorney, although the attorney is constrained from doing so.' Similarly,
existing mediation ethical codes such as the Standards of Practice for
Family and Divorce Mediation of the Academy of Family Mediators,
Ethical Standards of Professional Responsibility of the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and the AAA/ABA/SPIDR
Standards of Conduct of Mediators impose the duty on the mediator
only. 78 Several state rules require only the mediator to keep secrets. 79
The trend for state statutes is not as clear. In Oklahoma, only the
mediator (and employees) have the duty,' while in Montana, both the
mediator and the disputants have the duty.8 ' In Oregon, the statute is
not clear: "[M]ediation communications are confidential and may not be

disclosed to any other person."8'
Following the general trend, the earliest draft of the UMA required
the mediator, but not the disputants, to keep secrets while providing
extensive and detailed exceptions." Over the next several sessions, the
76. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN EVIDENCE,
DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE § 5.2 (1995).
77. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM & EDWARD D. OHLBAUM, COURTROOM EVIDENCE: A
TEACHING COMMENTARY 450 (1997).
78. See, e.g., ACADEMY OF FAMILY MEDIATORS, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY

AND DIVORCE MEDIATION, at VI (1998),
/mediainformation/Medlnfo-Mediators/Ethics-AFM.htm

available at www.mediatoradr.net
(last visited July 12, 2001) [hereinafter

AFM STANDARDS]; SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION,

SPIDR's

ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 3 (1992), available at
http://www.spidr.orglethic.htm (last visited July 17, 2001) [hereinafter SPIDR's ETHICAL
STANDARDS]; MODEL STANDARDS, supranote 10, § V.
79. See, e.g., IOWA RULES GOVERNING STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYER
MEDIATORS IN FAMILY DISPUTES, R. 2 (2000) [hereinafter IOWA RULES]; KAN. SUP. CT.R.
903 (2001); FLA. R. OF COURT § 10.360 (West 2001).
80. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805 (West 1993).
81. MONT. CODE ANN. §26-1-813 (1999).
82. OR. REV. STAT. § 36.220 (1999).
83. NCCUSL, DRAFT UMA §§ (d)-(e) (April 16, 1998) [hereinafter APRIL 1998

DRAFT]. The sections state:
(d) General Rule of Non-Disclosure. A mediator shall not disclose mediation
communications other than the parties' written and signed agreement to others,
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Drafting Committees struggled with the structure of this provision and
its exceptions. First, they worked to craft the list of exceptions to strike
the appropriate balance between keeping secrets and the occasional
needs for disclosure8I Next, in December 1999, instead of a separate list
of exceptions, they limited the list and incorporated a reference to the
list of exceptions to the mediation privilege." Then, the March 2000
including the judge or other appointing authority who may make rulings on or
investigate the matters in dispute, unless compelled to testify. [A court or agency
may impose such legal, equitable, or administrative relief as will effectuate the
purpose of the Act].
(e) Exceptions to Non-Disclosure. A mediator may disclose mediation
communications in the following circumstances, but only as needed to achieve the
purposes of the exception:
(1) Threatened Harm. The mediator learns of explicit or implied threats to cause
another to suffer substantial bodily harm or serious destruction of property.
(2) Reports of Crime. Federal law or state law that a mediator reasonably
believes to be applicable requires the mediator to report crimes to appropriate
authorities.
(3) Program Monitoring. To the provision of statistical mediation effectiveness so
long as the data cannot be attributed to a particular case or person.
(4) [State should specify whether public records and public meetings laws take
precedence over the non-disclosure provisions of this statute.]
(5) Conflicts of Law. [See Reporter's Notes].
Id.
84. See, e.g., NCCUSL, DRAFr UMA § 3(d) (March 1999) [hereinafter MARCH 1999
DRAFr] (adding exceptions for abuse and neglect of protected individuals such as children,
professional misconduct, and plans to commit a crime).
85. See, e.g., NCCUSL, DRAFr UMA §§ 2(b)-(c), 3 (December 1999) [hereinafter
DECEMBER 1999 DRAFT]. The sections state:
Section 2. CONFIDENTIALITY.
(b) A mediator has a privilege to [refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other
person from disclosing, the mediator's mediation communications and may] refuse
to provide evidence of mediation communications in a civil, juvenile, criminal
misdemeanor, arbitration, or administrative proceeding....
(c) There is no privilege under subsection[s] ... (b) of this section nor prohibition
against disclosure under section 3:
(1) for a record of an agreement between two or more disputants;
(2) for mediation communications that threaten to cause bodily injury or unlawful
property damage;
(3) for a disputant or mediator who uses or attempts to use the mediation to plan
or commit a crime;
(4) in a proceeding in which a public agency is protecting the interests of a child,
disabled adult, or elderly adult protected by law, for mediation communications
offered to prove abuse or neglect;
(5) if a court determines, after a hearing with consideration of the mediation
communications occurring only under seal, that the proponent has shown that the
evidence is not otherwise available and there is overwhelming need for disclosure to
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Draft went through a radical simplification: "[A] mediator may not
disclose mediation communications unless all of the disputants agree, or
the mediator reasonably believes that disclosure is required by law, a
specific public policy established by statute or court decision, or
professional reporting requirements.' 86 Contemporaneous with the late
present [sic] a manifest injustice of such a magnitude as to substantially outweigh the
importance of protecting the confidentiality of mediation communications;
[(6) in a report required to be made to an entity charged by law to oversee
professional misconduct for mediation communications evidencing professional
misconduct that occurs during the mediation session.]
[(7) to the extent found necessary by a court, arbirator, or agency if the disputant
files a claim or complaint against a mediator or mediation program alleging
misconduct arising from the mediation.]
[(8) as to evidence provided by the disputants, to the extent found necessary by a
court, arbitrator, or agency in a proceeding in which defenses of fraud or duress are
raised regarding an agreement evidenced by a record and reached by the disputants
as the result of the mediation.]
[(9) to the extent found necessary by a court or administrative agency hearing
officer if a person who is not a disputant and to whom a disputant owes a duty files a
claim or complaint against the disputant related to the disputant's conduct in the
mediation.]
[(10) for the sessions of a mediation that must be open to the public under the law
or that the disputants agree to make open to the public and in which the disputants
discuss changing decisions of government agencies that have general applicability
and future effect.]
Section 3. CONFIDENTIALITY.
(a) A mediator may not disclose mediation communications, including a report,
assessment, evaluation, recommendation or finding regarding a mediation, to
anyone, including disclosure to a judge or to an agency or authority that refers the
matter to mediation or employs that mediator and that may make rulings on or
investigations into the dispute that is the subject matter of the mediation.
(b) There is an exception to the prohibition in subsection (a) if:
1. The parties agree to the disclosure,
2. For public policy reasons,
3. A mediator [reasonably] believes that disclosure is required by law or
professional reporting requirements, or
4. An exception is provided in section 2(c).
Id.
86. NCCUSL, DRAFr UMA § 7(a) (March 2000) [hereinafter MARCH 2000 DRAFT].
This draft contained the following provision:
A mediator may not provide a report, assessment, evaluation, recommendation, or
finding regarding a mediation, to a court, agency, or authority that may make rulings
on or investigations into a dispute that is the subject of the mediation, other than
whether the mediation occurred, a report of attendance at mediation sessions,
whether the mediation has terminated, or whether settlement was reached....
Id. § 7(b).
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1999 and early 2000 changes, the drafts specifically negated any
inference that a duty of confidentiality extended to the disputants. For

instance, the March 2000 Draft stated that the UMA "does not restrict
the disclosure of mediation communications by disputants outside of
discovery and evidentiary proceedings except as may be limited by the

agreement of the disputants, or by court or administrative order."'
Finally, the drafters had had enough, and the general prohibition
against disclosure (with limited exceptions) was removed from the draft
in August 2000, leaving only a narrower provision preventing the
mediator from providing "a report, assessment, evaluation,
recommendation, or finding regarding a mediation to a court... other
than whether the mediation occurred, a report of attendance at

mediation sessions, whether the mediation has terminated, and whether
settlement was reached, except as permitted [by the parties or under the
exceptions to the mediation privilege]."' As a result, a mediator was
prohibited from giving opinions about who was right or wrong and was
also prohibited from characterizing the conduct of the parties. Beyond

that, the mediator had no duty to keep secrets.
The disclosure provision remained relatively unchanged until the last
drafting session in February 2001. The Drafting Committees, under
pressure from the mediation community,'o inserted a brief, five word

87. Id. § 7(c); see also DECEMBER 1999 DRAFr, supra note 85, § 3(c) ("Except as limited by
agreement or court or administrative order, a disputant may disclose mediation communications
outside of civil, juvenile, criminal misdemeanor, arbitration, or administrative proceedings.").
88. NCCUSL, DRAFr UMA § 10(b) (August 2000) [hereinafter AUGUST 2000 DRAFr].
89. Memo from Emily Haynes, Reporting Coordinator for NCCUSL, to "Those
Following the Uniform Mediation Act" § 5 (February 13, 2001) (on file with author)
(reporting on the substantive changes to the UMA made by the Drafting Committees at their
February 2001 drafting session in New Orleans and stating that the addition of a
confidentiality provision was in "response to significant observer concerns that the draft did
not emphasize the confidential nature of mediation."); see also letter from Dr. Arnold
Shienvold, President, Association for Conflict Resolution (formerly SPIDR), to Judge
Michael Getty, Chair of the NCCUSL Drafting Committee (February 5, 2001) (on file with
author). This letter states:
[Tihe ACR believes that the UMA should set forth and provide the general rule
that what is said in mediation is confidential. The notion that communication in
mediation will remain private and confidential is inherent in the mediation process
itself. For several years, mediations have been conducted with the understanding
that, except for specifically articulated public policy reasons, what is said during the
mediation process will not be disclosed to anyone.
As has been the practice in several states ... the UMA should contain a general
confidentiality provision. We believe that this provision should broadly apply to all
participants in mediation ....
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confidentiality provision in the section dealing with privileges: "A
mediation communication is confidential . .

.

. ,9 Interestingly, the

drafters failed to carve out any exceptions to this rule. However, the
final draft that NCCUSL adopted at its annual meeting in August, 2001,
removed this language and added a new section which leaves the
question of confidentiality very much in the air.9'
However, as we shall see, the issue of keeping secrets represents
only a small problem when compared to the difficulties faced when
trying to establish a mediation privilege.
B. Privileges:Freedomfrom Involuntary Testimony
The second principle of confidentiality is the freedom from
involuntary testimony provided for in the statutes and evidentiary rules
regarding privileges." Most rules of evidence are intended to aid an
adjudicative body's search for truth by distinguishing unreliable
information from more probative evidence; rules of privilege,? in
We believe that providing for confidentiality of the mediation process in this manner
is a far better mechanism for assuring parties that they can be completely candid in
mediation, then leaving it to a case-by-case confidentiality contract between the
parties ....
Therefore, we strongly recommend that the Drafting Committee add a general
confidentiality provision to the Act.

Id.
90. NCCUSL, DRAFT UMA § 5(a) (May 2001) [hereinafter MAY2001 DRAFT].
91. UMA, supra note 7, § 8 ("Section 8. CONFIDENTIALITY. Unless subject to the
[insert statutory references to open meetings act and open records act], mediation
communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by other law
or rule of this State. ").
92. MCCORMICK, supra note 55, § 72. I have chosen the term "privilege" to include all
freedom from involuntary testimony although such freedom can take several forms including
privileges, exclusionary rules, and testimonial incapacity. The Drafting Committees have
structured the protections against such compulsion as a privilege. For a more thorough
explanation of the distinctions between privileges, exclusionary rules, and testimonial incapacity,
see MARCH 2000 DRAF, supra note 86, § 5 Reporter's Working Notes § 3; SCOTT H. HUGHES,
REPORT TO SPIDR ON THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING A UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT 17-29
(January 25, 1999) (copy on file with author) (containing discussion of the scope of who can
invoke protections and the policy considerations behind the types of protection); Developments in
the Law: PrivilegedCommunications,98 HARV. L. REV. 1450 (1985).
93. See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2175 (1961)
(rev. by John T. McNaughton) [hereinafter WIGMORE]. Wigmiore explains that:
The rules of admissibility.., fall into three general groups: (1) Those which
determine the relevancy of circumstantial and testimonial evidence-this is, the
fundamental quality without which no evidential data are to be allowed to be
considered by the jury .... (2) Those auxiliary rules of probative policy which
impose artificially some added conditions of admissibility, but are directed solely to
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contrast, exclude information which may be extremely helpful to the
court in its search for the truth.94 Privileges do not promote the search
for the truth through reliable evidence. Rather, "their effect is to
obstruct... the search for truth, and in that this effect is consciously
accepted as less harmful on the whole than the extrinsic disadvantages
which would ensue to other interests of society if no such limitations

existed." 5 When a privilege attaches to a confidential relationship, a
normative choice has been made that society is better served by
fostering the relationship even though this may deprive the court of
valuable, or even conclusive, evidence. 96
The twin principles of the duty of confidentiality and privilege are
not identical and, therefore, generate confusion in the field of
mediation.' In professional relationships, three general distinctions
should be kept in mind. First, as stated above, the duty of
confidentiality in other professional relationships is imposed upon the
professional and not on the person being served.98 There is no
improving the quality of proof and strengthening the probabilities of ascertaining
the truth as the result of investigation .... And, (3) the [the rules of privilege and
others]-those rules which rest on no purpose of improving the search after truth
but on the willingness to yield to requirements of extrinsic policy. They forbid the
admission of various sorts of evidence because some consideration extrinsic to the
investigation of truth is regarded as more important and overpowering.

Id.
94. See Delaware ex rel. State Dep't Highway v. 62.96247 Acres of Land, 193 A.2d 799, 806
(Del. Super. Ct. 1963). This court notes:
There are many exclusionary rules of evidence that are intended to withhold
evidence which is regarded as unreliable or regarded as prejudicial or misleading,
but rules of privileged communications have no such purpose. Such rules of
privilege preclude the consideration of competent evidence which could aid in
determining the outcome of a case, and privilege in no way can be justified as a
means of promoting a fair settlement of disputes.

Id.
95. WIGMORE, supra note 93, § 2175.
96. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("Limitations are properly placed upon the operation of this general principle only to the very
limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth.").
97. See, eg., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02.3(B) (Anderson 1998) ("A mediation
communication is confidential .... [N]o person shall disclose a mediation communication in a
civil proceeding or in an administrative proceeding.").
98. See Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1426, 1456 (1982) ("A duty of confidentiality could arise whenever personal information is
received from another in confidence.... Anyone in whom 'confidence [is] reposed' is liable for
unprivileged disclosure or use of a trade secret or an unpublished literary work.") (alteration in
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reciprocal duty on the client, penitent, or patient; each is free to disclose
at will. However, disclosure by the principal may have an adverse
impact on the ability to assert a privilege later on." Second, although
the professional is bound by ethical codes or statutory authority to keep
client confidences, a duty of confidentiality does not bind third parties
who may seek to compel involuntary testimony about the matters
covered by the duty of confidentiality."°° Finally, while privileges are
designed to protect individuals from involuntary disclosure in court or
administrative proceedings, like the duty of confidentiality, they do not
prohibit the principal from making voluntary disclosures outside the
courtroom.'' Such disclosure, however, may be an impediment to later
asserting the privilege."°
C. Within the Uniform Mediation Act

During the Committee's deliberations, there was little debate that
the mediator-disputant relationship should be treated with the normal
accouterments of other professional relationships. A high level of
candor by and between the disputants is essential both for the
functioning of the mediator-disputant relationship and the mediation
process. °3 Candor is created and fulfilled only "by maintaining the
disputants' and mediators' expectations regarding confidentiality of
mediation communications. "'
The logic behind mediation
confidentiality is more fully explored below.' 5
There is no doubt that confidentiality (both keeping secrets and
original).
99. See GRAHAM & OHLBAUM, supra note 77, at 469.
100. See Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transitionfrom Theory to Implementation:
DesigningA Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants,the Process and the
PublicInterest, 1995 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 10-11 (1995) ("Because the law views courts as entitled to
.every [person]'s evidence,' public policy forbids contracting to exclude evidence.") (alteration in
original).
101. See MCCORMICK, supra note 55, § 72.1. But see Berry v. Moench, 331 P.2d 814 (Utah
1958).
102. See MCCORMICK, supra note 55, § 93; People v. Bloom, 85 N.E. 824, 826 (N.Y. 1908)
("[W]hen a secret is out, it is out for all time, and cannot be caught again like a bird, and put back
in its cage.").
103. See APRIL 1998 DRAFT, supra note 83, at "Rationale for a Statute on Mediation
Confidentiality."
104. MARCH 2000 DRAFT, supra note 86, at Prefatory Note § 1; see also id § 2 Reporter's
Working Notes § 2; APRIL 1998 DRAFr, supra note 83; Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L.
Prigoff, Confidentialityin Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL 37
(1986); Kirtley, supra note 100, at 17.
105. See infra Part III.A.
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avoiding testimony) represents the principle thrust of the UMA. Of the
nine substantive sections of the Act, lO five deal exclusively with
' 0)Scope,"
9
confidentiality."0 Two more sections, "Definitions" land
have been debated and structured primarily by their relationship to
confidentiality. Of the five substantive definitions contained in the
three
("Mediation
Communication,""'
"Nonparty
UMA, 0
'
1
participant,"' and "Mediation party" ) have also been written and
structured to deal principally with confidentiality.
This notion that confidentiality is the principle driving force behind
the Committees' drafting effort is supported by the language of the

106. UMA, supranote 7. The UMA has 16 sections: § 1. Title; § 2. Definitions; § 3. Scope; §
4. Privilege Against Disclosure; Admissibility, Discovery, § 5. Waiver and Preclusion of Privilege;
§ 6. Exceptions to Privilege; §7. Prohibited Mediator Reports; § 8. Confidentiality, § 9. Mediator's
Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest; Background; § 10. Participation in Mediation; § 11. Relation to
Electronic Signature in Global and National Commerce Act; § 12. Uniformity of Application and
Construction; § 13. Severability Clause; § 14. Effective Date; § 15. Repeals; § 16. Application to
Existing Agreements or Referrals. Id.
107. Id. The five sections which deal exclusively with confidentiality are: § 4. Privilege
Against Disclosure; Admissibility, Discovery, § 5. Waiver and Preclusion of Privilege; § 6.
Exceptions to Privilege; § 7. Prohibited Mediator Reports; § 8. Confidentiality. Id.
108. Id.§2.
109. Id. § 3. The heart of this section, which excludes certain types of mediation, grew out of
concerns about the impact that confidentiality might have in these arenas. Specifically, the
exclusion of school-based peer mediation programs was drafted because the specific
responsibilities of schools to children might conflict with the confidentiality provisions of the
UMA. SEPTEMBER 2001 DRAFr, supra note 11, at Reporter's Notes § 3.
110. UMA, supra note 7. The five substantive definitions are: § 2(1) "Mediation"; § 2(2)
"Mediation Communication"; 2(3) "Mediator"; § 2(4) "Nonparty participant"; and § 2(5)
"Mediation party."
111. Id. § 2(2). "This definition is aimed primarily at the privilege provisions of Sections 46." SEPTEMBER2001 DRAFt, supra note 11, § 2 Reporter's Notes § 2.
112. UMA, supra note 7, § 2(4). "This definition is pertinent to the privilege accorded
nonparty participants in Section 4(b)(3)." SEPTEMBER 2001 DRAFT, supra note 11, § 2
Reporter's Notes § 4.
113. UMA, supranote 7, § 2(5). The Reporter's Notes of the September draft explain:
The Act defines "party" to be a person who participates in a mediation and has
some stake in the resolution of the dispute, or whose agreement is necessary to
resolve the dispute. These limitations are designed to prevent someone with only a
passing interest in the mediation, such as a neighbor ... from attending the
mediation and then blocking the use of information or taking advantage of rights
meant to be accorded to parties....
Because of these structural limitations on the definitions of parties, participants
who do not meet the definition of "party", [sic] such as a witness or expert on a
given issue, do not hold the privilege ....
SEPTEMBER2001 DRAFt, supra note 11, § 2 Reporter's Notes § 5.
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Prefatory Note to the UMA.14 For the three fundamental obligations of
the UMA (to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and self-determination),
the Prefatory Note has twenty-five references to confidentiality.'
On
the other hand, process integrity and self-determination garner only five
apiece, some of which are relegated to the final paragraphs of the
Prefatory Note where the Drafting Committees stress the need to
"keep[ ] the Act shorter by leaving some discretion in the courts.""17
If protecting confidentiality represented the predominant mission of
the Drafting Committees, the creation of a mediation privilege and the
protections it will provide for mediators epitomizes the heart and soul of
this effort. "The primary focus of this Act is a limited one - to provide a
privilege that assures confidentiality in legal proceedings."" 8 The Act
does this, not only by creating a privilege for the disputant,"' but also by
creating one for the mediator, as well." On this point, the drafters are
not following any trend. Many state statutes do not clearly designate
the holder of the privilege.' Those that do appear to be "split between

114. SEPTEMBER 2001 DRAFT, supra note 11, at Prefatory Note. This is further reinforced
by an examination of one of the earliest drafts of the UMA. In the first textual discussion
contained in the draft, the section is entitled "Rationale for a Statute on Mediation
Confidentiality." APRIL 1998 DRAFt, supra note 83.
115. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
116. SEPTEMBER 2001 DRAFT, supra note 11, at Prefatory Note (including references to
privileges).
117. Id. at Prefatory Note § 5. The Prefatory Note explains: "[T]he drafters sought to
make the provisions accessible and understandable to readers from a variety of backgrounds,
sometimes keeping the Act shorter by leaving some discretion in the courts to apply the
provisions in accordance with the general purposes of the Act." Id.
118. Id at Prefatory Note § 1.
119. UMA, supra note 7, § 4(b)(1) ("In a proceeding, the following privileges apply: (1) A
mediation party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person from disclosing, a
mediation communication.").
120. Id. § 4(b)(2)-(3) ("In a proceeding, the following privileges apply: ... (2) A mediator
may refuse to disclose a mediation communication, and may prevent any other person from
disclosing a mediation communication of the mediator. (3) A nonparty participant may refuse to
disclose, and may prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication of the
nonparty participant."). This rather convoluted language was crafted to allow the parties to waive
the privilege jointly, but only as to their own communications, but not the mediator's.
Interestingly, the Act also creates a privilege for individuals who are neither parties or mediators,
such as experts, but only as to their own statements or reports. SEPTEMBER 2001 DRAFT, supra
note 11, § 4(b), Reporter's Notes §§ 3,4(c).
121. See 710 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/6 (West 1998) (not-for-profit dispute resolution
centers); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-13 (Michie 1997) (certificated educational employee
bargaining); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679.12 (West Supp 2000) (general); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
26, § 1026 (West 1988) (university labor relations); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150, § 10A (West
1996) (labor disputes).
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those that make the disputants the only holders of the privilege,1" and
'
those that also make the mediator a holder.hl
However, the idea of
extending the privilege to the agent or helper is unique among all of the
professional relationships.124 The argument for a separate mediator
privilege rests upon the continuing need for impartiality:
Although objectively neutral and accurate, any testimony by the
mediator will almost certainly be favorably perceived by one side
and not so favorably by the other. The consequences will usually
occur after the completion of the mediation and so any negative
impact on the perceived impartiality will not be detrimental to a
mediator vis-h-vis one-time disputants, but may adversely affect a
mediator who works in a small community or is frequently
employed by the same parties.
Further, this may have
unfortunate repercussions for mediation as an institution if the
disputants misconstrue this testimony as an indictment of
mediation in general and pass on their unfavorable opinions to
others. In essence, the mediator should be free from having to
take sides. These conclusions, nonetheless, are based upon
theory only and not upon empirical data. The extent of any
detrimental impact on mediator impartiality has not been
demonstrated.
Conversely, the mediator serves as the agent of the parties, as
servant if you will, and, therefore, should have no rights separate
from those derived from the parties. The disputants should have
the freedom to choose and to make silly mistakes. If this
position is accepted, the mediator should not have a separately
122. See ARi7_. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (West 1994) (general); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
61.183 (West 1997) (divorce); MICH. COME. LAVS ANN. § 691.1557 (West 2000) (community
dispute resolution); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-7 (1999) (fair housing); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.785
(1999) (domestic relations); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (Michie Supp. 1999) (general); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.10 (Michie 1999) (general) (providing that the disputants are the sole
holders).
123. MARCH 2000 DRAFr, supra note 86, § 5 Reporter's Working Notes 6(b). See CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1122 (West Supp 2001) (general); LA. REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (West Supp.
2001) (general); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-813 (1999)(general); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.023 (West 1998) (general) (which make the mediator an additional holder).
124. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 76, § 5.6. The authors elaborate:
With respect to professional privileges, the holder is usually the recipient of the
professional services rather than the provider. It is the client-not the lawyer, the
patient-not the psychotherapist, who decides whether the privilege will be waived
or asserted. The professional person lacks authority to ...assert a privilege that the
holder has waived.
Id. (citations omitted); MCCORMICK, supranote 55, § 92.
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assertable grivilege and should testify if the privilege is waived by

all parties.
However, as we shall see in the following portions of the paper,
these are not the most glaring problems with the UMA.
III. EXCEPTIONS TO PRIVILEGES IN THE UMA
A. The ArtificialDivision of Exceptions

1. The Need That Substantially Outweighs
The key to understanding the UMA can be found in section 6 which
contains the exceptions to the privileges created in section 4. The
exceptions are divided into two groups, with subsection 6(a) covering
the less controversial exceptions, including agreements reached during
mediation, sessions which by law must be open to the public, threats,
plans to commit a crime, abuse of a protected individual, complaints of
professional malpractice (other than the mediator), and mediator
misconduct." 6 Section 6(b)," on the other hand, contains two more
125. See HUGHES, supra note 92, at 20-21; see also MARCH 2000 DRAFr, supra note 86, § 5
Reporter's Working Notes (" [The perceived neutrality of the mediator is a key justification for
the privilege, which leads to the conclusion that the mediator should be a holder of the
privilege.").
126. UMA, supra note 7, § 6(a). This section states:
(a) There is no privilege under Section 4 for a mediation communication that is:
(1) in an agreement evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement;
(2) available to the public under [insert statutory reference to open records act]
or made during a session of a mediation which is open, or is required by law to be
open, to the public;
(3) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a crime of
violence;
(4) intentionally used to plan a crime, attempt to commit or commit a crime, or to
conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity;
(5) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of professional
misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator;
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), sought or offered to prove or
disprove a claim or complaint of professional misconduct or malpractice filed against
a mediation party, nonparty participant, or representative of a party based upon
conduct occurring during a mediation; or
(7) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect, abandonment, or
exploitation in a proceeding in which a child or adult protective services agency is a
party, unless the
[Alternative A: [State to insert, for example, child child or adult protection] case
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proceedings
and
contractual
controversial
exceptions-felony
The Drafting Committees have segregated the two
misconduct.
exceptions in section 6(b) in order to accomplish an important goal.
Because the drafters (with the support of the mediation community)
believe that mediation communications should be off limits in many
cases, they have created a screening test that imposes nearly
insurmountable hurdles for any seekers of mediation information in
these instances.
To better understand the exception for contractual misconduct, it is
important to trace its history along with an additional exception,
While the exception to the privilege for
mediator malpractice.
contractual misconduct is now screened by the language contained in
section 6(b), the exception for claims against the mediator is not
restricted. However, this was not always the case. The mediator
malpractice section started without restrictions, was prefaced by the
screening test for many drafts, but is unfettered in the draft adopted by
the NCCUSL.
From the time that the exceptions for contractual misconduct and
mediator malpractice first appeared until January 2000, access to both
The first mention of the mediator
exceptions was unfettered."
malpractice exception appears in the draft of April 16, 1998, and is listed
along with nine other exceptions and introduced with a simple lead-in
phrase: "There is no privilege under this statute... (9) ...[t]o the
degree ruled necessary by the court, if a party files a claim against the
is referred by a court to mediation and a public agency participates.]
[Alternative B: public agency participates in the [State to insert, for example,
child or adult protection] mediation].

Id.(alteration in original).
127. Id§6(b). This section identifies the exceptions to the privilege:
(b) There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative agency, or
arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the
proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available,
that there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in
protecting confidentiality, and that the mediation communication is sought or
offered in:
(1) a court proceeding involving a felony [or misdemeanor]; or
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove a claim
to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the
mediation.
Id. (alteration in original).
128. See, eg., DECEMBER 1999 DRAFt, supra note 85, §2(c). This section which contained
all of the exceptions to the mediation privilege, was introduced with this language: "There is no
privilege.., nor prohibition against disclosure." Id.
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mediator on issues arising from the mediation."' 29 The mediator
malpractice exception appears without restraints in all nine subsequent
drafts of the UMA.30 through December 1999, with increasingly
elaborate language. The December 1999 Draft contains this language:
"There is no privilege.., nor prohibition against disclosure... (7) to
the extent found necessary by a court, arbitrator, or agency if the
disputant files a claim or complaint against a mediator or mediation
program alleging misconduct arising from the mediation."'
The contractual misconduct exception to the mediation privilege has

a much more recent history, having first appeared in the March 20, 1999
Draft after a recommendation by the Academic Advisory Committee.!
It joined mediator malpractice and seven others as a simple exception
without a gateway test: "There is no [exception] ...[t]o establish the

validity or invalidity of a recorded agreement."'33 The provision appears

129. APRIL 1998 DRAFT, supra note 83, § (c)(9).
130. These drafts include NCCUSL, DRAFT UMA (Nov. 1998); NCCUSL, DRAFT UMA
(Nov. 14, 1998); NCCUSL, DRAFr UMA (Feb. 19, 1999); MARCH 1999 DRAFT, supra note 84;
NCCUSL, DRAFr UMA (Mar. 20, 1999) [hereinafter MARCH 20, 1999 DRAFT]; NCCUSL,
DRAFt UMA (Mar. 21, 1999) [hereinafter MARCH 21, 1999 DRAFT]; NCCUSL, DRAFr UMA
(Apr. 1999) [hereinafter APRIL 1999 DRAFr]; NCCUSL, DRAFt UMA (June 1, 1999)
[hereinafter JUNE 1, 1999 DRAFT]; and DECEMBER 1999 DRAF, supra note 85. In the drafts
starting with March 21, 1999 the exceptions (among others) are contained in brackets. This does
not appear to be an attempt to limit the access to the exception since section 2(c)(7) of the
Reporter's Notes states: "The drafters seek comment on whether this issue is sufficiently covered
by the exception for manifest injustice ...and is therefore unnecessary." See, e.g., APRIL 1999
DRAFt, supra § 2 Reporter's Working Notes § 2(c)(7). Starting with the DECEMBER 1999
DRAFT, the title page states that bracketed language is offered for discussion only and "has not
been even tentatively approved by either Drafting Committee." DECEMBER 1999 DRAFt, supra
note 85, at title page. The disclaimer about tentative approval is a misnomer because the
language had been tentatively approved by the Drafting Committees and, as stated above,
appeared in several drafts. See, e g., MARCH 20,1999 DRAFT, § 2(c)(4).
131. DECEMBER 1999 DRAFT, supra note 85, § 2(c)(7).
132. MARCH 1999 DRAFT, supra note 84, § 2(d). See also APRIL 1999 DRAFt, supra note
130, § 2 Reporter's Working Notes § 2(c)(7). The Working Notes explain:
This provision is designed to preserve contract defenses, which otherwise would be
unavailable if based on mediation communications. A recent Texas case provides
an example. An action brought to enforce a mediation settlement. The defendant
raised the defense of duress and sought to introduce evidence that he had asked the
mediator to leave because of chest pains and a history of heart trouble, and that the
mediator had refused to let him leave the mediation session. See Randle v. Mid
Gulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292, 1996 WL 447954 (Tex. App. 1996) (unpublished).
Id. (citation in original).
133. MARCH 1999 DRAFT, supra note 84, § 2(d) Reporter's Working Notes § 2(d)(7)
(alteration in original).
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in the April" 4 and June 1, 1999135 drafts, although with slightly more
elaborate language: "There is no protection ...(8) [t]o establish the
validity or invalidity, or the enforceability or nonenforceability of an
agreement reached by the disputants as the result
of the mediation
1 36
session if the agreement is evidenced by a record."

Finally, in the December 1999 Draft, both the mediator malpractice
and contractual misconduct exceptions appear without reservations,

along with eight others:
There is no privilege... nor prohibition against disclosure...
[(7) to the extent found necessary by a court, arbitrator, or

agency if the disputant files a claim or complaint against a
mediator or mediation program alleging misconduct arising from
the mediation.]
[(8) as to evidence provided by the disputants, to the extent
found necessary by a court, arbitrator, or agency in a proceeding
in which defenses of fraud or duress are raised regarding an
agreement evidenced by a record and reached by the disputants

as the result of the mediation.]"
The drafters significantly narrowed the scope of contractual defenses
and the source of testimony to prove those defenses. By limiting the

exception to fraud or duress, the drafters eliminated common law
defenses such as unconscionability, misrepresentation, impossibility,
overreaching, mistake, recission, reformation, and others."4
For
instance, the case of the Negligent Neutral (which is based upon mutual
mistake) would not fall within this exception even though the damage is
134. APRIL1999 DRAFT, supra note 130, § 2(c)(8).
135. JuNE 1,1999 DRAFT, supra note 130, § 2(c)(8).
136. See, eg., APRIL1999 DRAFT, supra note 130 § 2(c).
137. DECEMBER 1999 DRAFT, supra note 85, § 2(c) (brackets in original).
138. See Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110,1132,1140 (N.D. Cal. 1999). See
generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTI- ON CONTRACTS § 4.2-.28 (2d ed. 1998);
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS ch. 9 (4th ed. 1998).
Although Olam's defense to enforcing the agreement reached in mediation sounded in duress,
Ms. Olam alleged "undue influence" and sought rescission under California Civil Code §
1689(b)(1) which provides: "Aparty to a contract may rescind the contract in the following cases:
(1) If the consent of the party rescinding.., was.., obtained through... undue influence,
exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds." CAL. Civ. CODE §
1689(b)(1) (West Supp. 2001). Is it necessary to trigger a statute whose terminology fits within
the ambit of "fraud or duress" as contained within the UMA or is it sufficient that the underlying
action sounds within the crucial words?
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no less grievous than if it had resulted from fraud or duress. Further,
under this language ("evidence provided by the disputants ... "), the

parties would be prohibited from calling the mediator in an attempt to
prove any contractual defenses because evidence can only be "provided
by the disputants." 3 9
As work continued on the UMA and the participation by observers
increased, many in the mediation community expressed a fear that some
exceptions to the privilege may be subject to abuse by attorneys. If an
attorney brought an action regarding the mediation, they surmised, the
attorney could use an unrestricted exception to open up the entire
mediation to discovery and eradicate the original protections intended
by the creation of the privilege. Further, such actions would require
those resisting any subpoenas or other discovery efforts to take
affirmative steps and seek a protective order.
In response to this fear, the drafters, for the first time (in the January
2000 Draft) segregated these exceptions (and others) and imposed a
screening test for some of the exceptions:
There is no privilege nor prohibition... if a judicial,
administrative, or arbitration tribunal finds, after an in camera
hearing, that the disputant seeking discovery or the proponent of
the evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise
available, that there is an overwhelming need for the evidence
that substantially outweighs the importance of the state's policy
favoring the protection of confidentiality. '
Other than two minor changes, this screening test has remained
substantively unchanged. While the first words of the current section
6(a)"4 ' merely introduce a list of exceptions to the mediation privilege,
section 6(b) requires a preliminary screening before access to the
exceptions can be obtained:
There is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative
agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the
party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence has
shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that there is a
need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in
protecting confidentiality, and that the mediation communication
139. See infra Part III.B.
140. NCCUSL, DRAFr UMA § 2(f) (Jan. 2000) [hereinafter JANUARY2000 DRAFr].
141. UMA, supra note 7, § 6(a).
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is sought or offered in .... "'
The provision imposes both a procedural burden and a substantive test
before a court can allow a litigant to subpoena the disputants or the
mediator. Procedurally, the seeker of the evidence must show, in
camera, "that the evidence is not otherwise available" 43 before the court
will allow any discovery. The remainder of section 6(b) then imposes a
substantive test which requires the court to find that the "need for the
evidence.., substantially outweighs the interest in protecting
confidentiality. 1"4
The list of exceptions to the mediation privilege screened by this
provision and its predecessors has varied widely from one draft to
another. When it originally appeared in the January 2000 draft, the list
included threats, planning a crime, abuse or neglect, professional
malpractice (including mediator malpractice), contractual misconduct
(limited to fraud, duress, or incapacity), and other extraordinary
situations.'
During the drafting session in January 2000, the Drafting
Committees agreed to remove the exceptions for threats, planning a
crime, and abuse and neglect from the screening test and place them in
the regular list of exceptions!" The list of screened exceptions then
included professional malpractice, contractual misconduct, and one new
exception, significant threats to public health or safety. 7 This list of
screened exceptions remained relatively unchanged until drafting
sessions in 2001, when the drafters moved the professional malpractice
exception to the regular (unscreened) list,'" added an exception for
felony criminal proceedings,"9 and all together eliminated the exception
for threats to public health and safety.5
The screening test contained in section 6(b) of the UMA creates an
artificially high and totally inappropriate standard which arguably
abrogates common law contractual defenses.
Two fundamental
questions arise from this language. First, what is sufficient "need for the
evidence"? Is it the magnitude of the injustice being alleged? In other
142 Id. § 6(b).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. JANUARY 2000 DRAFT, supra note 140, § 2(f).
146. MARCH 2000 DRAFT, supra note 86, § 8(a)-(b).

147. Id. § 8(b)(3).
148. UMA, supra note 7, § 6(a)(5)-(6).
149. Id. § 6(b)(1).

150. Id. § 6.
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words, are parties with little injustices denied access to the evidence
because they did not suffer enough while those with big injustices are
granted access? If so, how do you separate little injustices from big
injustices-is it merely a measure of damages? Second, what is "the
interest in protecting confidentiality"? And, does the interest in
protecting confidentiality rise or fall on the need for the court to clear its
docket?
Second, what should the burden of proof be on the proponent during
the in camera hearing? Where the language reads "substantially
outweighs," is the standard similar to probable cause... or a prima facie
case?... Or does the language require a preponderance of the
evidence,'53 a clear and convincing showing," or an even greater level
such as "beyond a reasonable doubt" ?... On both issues, the Reporter's
Working Notes merely restate the standard in slightly different, but no
less vague terms: "The exceptions under this subsection constitute
unusual fact patterns that may sometimes justify carving an exception,
but only when the need is strong, the evidence is otherwise unavailable,
and these considerations outweigh the policies underlying the privilege
and prohibitions from disclosure."'56
A recent federal case will help illustrate this dilemma. In Olam v.
Congress Mortgage Co.,' 7 U.S. Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil, one of
the most erudite members of the ADR community, set aside the
mediator's privilege and required him to testify whether the defendant
had been coerced into settling during a mediation.5 Before agreeing to
mediate in September of 1998,' Congress Mortgage and Donna Olam
conducted a running battle over more than five years of negotiations,
work-out and extension agreements, injunctions, aborted settlement
discussions, and the instant lawsuit. ' Finally, after nearly fifteen hours
of mediation, the parties signed an agreement at 1:00 a.m. Ms. Olam
later repudiated the agreement reached in mediation, alleging she was,
151.
1989).
152.
153.
154.

See 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§

138 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 13th ed.

See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 61, § 3.4.
See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 55, § 339, at 514-15.
See id. § 340, at 515-16.

155. See 4 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 151, § 468, at 41.
156. SEPTEMBER 2001 DRAFt, supranote 11, § 6 Reporter's Notes § 9.

157.
158.
159.
160.

68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1116-17.
Idat 1113-16.
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quoting the court, "incapable (intellectually, emotionally, and
physically) of giving legally viable consent... [due to] physical pain and
emotional distress that rendered her incapable of exercising her own
free will."'

After the parties expressly waived any protections they had arising
from California law, Judge Brazil faced two overlapping provisions from
the California Evidence Code,'62 sections 703.513 and 1119. ' 64' Relying

upon a California Court of Appeals case, 65 the court found that both
sections had the effect of creating a separate privilege on behalf of the
mediator which is enforceable irrespective of the parties' wishes.'" The
court did not ask the mediator, a federal court employee, whether he
wished to raise the privilege, but raised the privilege for him. 67 Before
proceeding, the court stated that section 703.5 "is framed in terms of
competence to testify."'"' Having previously interpreted this section,
(along with section 1119) as creating a privilege on behalf of the
mediator, the court determined that section 703.5 "would require courts,
on their own initiative, to determine whether it would be lawful to
compel or permit a mediator to testify about matters occurring within a
161. Ic at 1118.
162. Id. at 1119-28. Judge Brazil conducted a rather exhaustive analysis of the choice of law
rules to determine that California law applies, based upon the issues surrounding the enforcement
of, and defenses to, a contract. Id.
163. CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5 (West 1995) ("No... mediator, shall be competent to testify,
in any subsequent civil proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling, occurring at
or in conjunction with the prior proceeding ... ").
164. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West Supp. 2001). This section provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter: (a) No evidence of anything said or
any admission made.., in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation ... is
admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be
compelled, in any... noncriminal proceeding .... (b) No writing... prepared ... in
the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation.., is admissible or subject to discovery,
and disclosure of the writing shall not be compelled, in any... noncriminal
proceeding.... (c) All communications.., by and between participants in the
course of a mediation ... shall remain confidential.
Id.
165. Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Ct. App. 1998).
166. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d, at 1130 ("It follows that, under California law, a waiver of the
mediation privilege by the parties is not a sufficient basis for a court to permit or order a mediator
to testify. Rather, an independent determination must be made before testimony from a
mediator should be permitted or ordered."). Interestingly enough, the court points out that
section 1122 can be read to extend a privilege to everyone who participates in the mediation, even
non-parties, such as experts, relatives, or observers. Id. at 1129 n.23.
167. ld. at 1130.
168. Id. at 1130-31.
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mediation." 169
After finding that the privilege was qualified 7 ' and that the court
could compel the mediator to testify despite his statutory
incompetency, 71 the court stated that its burden:
[was] to weigh and comparatively assess (1) the importance of
the values and interests that would be harmed if the mediator
was compelled to testify (perhaps subject to a sealing or
protective order, if appropriate), (2) the magnitude of the harm
that compelling the testimony would cause to those values and
interests, (3) the importance of the rights or interests that would
be jeopardized if the mediator's testimony was not accessible in
the specific proceedings in question, and (4) how much the
testimony would contribute toward protecting those rights or
advancing those interests-an inquiry that includes, among other
things, an assessment of whether there are alternative sources of
evidence of comparable probative value.'"
When deciding whether to compel a mediator's testimony, a court
must determine whether the damage to the mediation process is
outweighed by the damage to the individual's interests. The mediation
process is damaged by the injury inflicted upon the perceived
impartiality of the mediator.'
However, the risk of such harm is highly
contextual and depends both upon the nature of the mediator's
74 and the mediator's
testimony 174
style of mediation,'"7 which seem to be as
169. Itt at 1131.
170. Id. at 1130 (relying on Rinaker,74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468).
171. Id at 1131.
172. Idt at 1132.
173. Idt at 1133-34.
174. Idt at 1134. Is the testimony sought to aid the court to determine if a party was under
duress, thereby tending to relate to the appearance and demeanor of the person, or is the
testimony sought to prove the basis for fraud, thereby relating to what specific dialogue actually
occurred? If the former, the risk of damage to the trust may be less certain than if the mediator
was called upon to be a tie breaker in a case of "Hesaid. She said," although the exact reason this
may be the case is not clear from Judge Brazil's reasoning.
175. Id. at 1135. The court stated:
Moreover, the methods some mediators use to explore underlying interests and
feelings and to build settlement bridges are in some instances intentionally distanced
from the actual historical facts. In some mediations, the focus is on feelings rather
than facts. The neutral may ask the parties to set aside pre-occupations with what
happened as she tries to help the parties understand underlying motivations and
needs and to remove emotional obstacles through exercises in venting. Some
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numerous as the blades of grass on a well-manicured lawn. 76
Potential damage to the parties' interests must be factored by the
risk that it would actually occur in any given situation. Judge Brazil
emphasized that after more than fifteen years of responsibility for
administering ADR programs in the federal court, Olam represented
the first such instance where a mediator had been compelled to testify:
"Based on that experience, my partially educated guess is that the
likelihood that a mediator or the parties in any given case need fear that
the mediator would later be constrained to testify is extraordinarily
small. "77

On the opposite side of the scale, the court delineated and quantified
the individual's interests in having the mediator testify. Olam's interests
"could hardly be more fundamental."' 7 Enforcing an agreement she
alleges was unconscionable "would render her homeless and virtually
destitute. "i79
Conversely, failure to enforce the agreement would

officially sanction years of Olam's conduct, which cost Congress
Mortgage company thousands of dollars."'
However, the universe of potential interests must be more broadly
defined than just by those of the individual disputants. "It is the
fundamental duty of a public court in our society to do justice-to
mediators use hypotheticals that are expressly and intentionally not presented as
accurate reflections of reality-in order to help the parties explore their situation
and the range of solution options that might be available. A mediator might
encourage parties to "try on" certain ideas or feelings that the parties would contend
have little connection with past conduct, to experiment with the effects on
themselves and others of expressions of emotions or of openness to concessions or
proposals that, outside the special environment of the mediation, the parties would
not entertain or admit. All of this.., can have precious little to do with historical
accuracy or "truth."
Id. Additionally, the court continued in a footnote:
[T]he "mediations" that occur in at least some federal court ADR programs are
likely to be quite a bit more "evaluative" than the purely facilitative model would
contemplate. In fact, I suspect that in a good many "mediations" of cases filed in
federal court, the parties and the neutral pay considerable attention to evidence and
law-and that the negotiations revolve around fairly traditional analysis of
positions-as much as the mediators might want to shift focus to underlying interests
and to searches for creative solutions.
Id. at n.38.
176. See id. at 1135.
177. Id. at 1134.
178. Id. at 1136.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1136-37.
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resolve disputes in accordance with the law when the parties don't."18 '
Determining the facts in a case is central to doing justice." The court
felt it was in a position to fulfill this key duty because,
the mediator is positioned in this case to offer what could be
crucial, certainly very probative, evidence about the central
factual issues in this matter. There is a strong possibility that his
testimony will greatly improve the court's ability to determine
reliably what the pertinent historical facts actually were. [The
mediator's testimony, as a result,] would provide the court with
the evidentiary confidence it needs to enforce the agreement."",
The court then turned its attention to the impact such a decision
would have on mediation:
A publicly announced decision to enforce the settlement would,
in turn, encourage parties who want to try to settle their cases to
use the court's mediation program for that purpose. An order
appropriately enforcing an agreement reached through the
mediation also would encourage parties in the future to take
mediations seriously, to understand that they represent real
opportunities to reach closure and avoid trial, and to attend
carefully to terms of agreements proposed in mediations. In
these important ways, taking testimony from the mediator could
strengthen the mediation program."4
Although this language patently favors the company and presages the
court's ultimate decision to enforce the settlement agreement,'8 its
essence is crucially important. For the first time, a court considered the
positive impact upon the institution of mediation which would result
from piercing the mediation privilege and compelling the testimony of a
key, tie-breaking witness.
Consider the alternative. What might the negative impact on
mediation be if the court failed to allow the testimony of the mediator?
In order to do justice, the court must seek to avoid a disconnect between
the facts of the mediation and the ultimate decision. This is important
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

id. at 1136.
See id
Id. at 1136-37.
Id at 1137.
Id at 1139.
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not only because of the affect upon the public perception of the courts,
but also on the public perception of mediation itself. Failure to gather
all of the relevant testimony, especially when the court finds that the
mediator's testimony is the "only source of presumptively disinterested,
neutral evidence,"'8 would certainly create a substantial risk that any
final decision would not comport with the facts. Any alignment between
the facts and the final result would be attributable more to
happenstance than to a close scrutiny of the evidence available to the
trier of fact.
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that what is perceived as
real is real in its consequences. The actual correspondence between the
facts and the court's ultimate decision in any given case is of less
importance than the overall public perception of mediation, especially if
the public perceives that the court failed to consider relevant
information that was available. Notwithstanding the reason for the
court's denial of access to the crucial testimony (the impartiality of the
mediator, the integrity of the process, or a failure to meet the test that
the need substantially outweigh the interests of confidentiality), the
aggrieved party (or, as in Olam, aggrieved parties) will contend that the
rules of the institution of mediation wrongfully prevented access to
critical evidence. This perception will arise because the impediments to
the evidence are constructed within mediation itself, ultimately sowing
seeds of distrust for mediation as a viable form of dispute resolution.
While the mediation community sees a mediator's testimony as
potentially damaging to his or her individual neutrality, the disputant
sees the refusal to testify as damaging to the institutional neutrality of
mediation. The members of the mediation community, in supporting
the screening provisions found in section 6(b)," have put their
individual interests before the interests of mediation as an institution.
Does Judge Brazil's decision to compel the testimony of the
mediator add any value to this debate? On the negative side, the case
involved an express waiver by both parties of their individual privileges.
The court stated that the consideration of the issues would have been
complicated had one of the parties objected to the mediator testifying."
186. Id.at1138.
187. UMA, supra note 7, § 6(b).
188. Oam,68 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. After the court discussed the importance of maintaining
confidentiality in order to promote candor between the parties, it stated:
While this court has no occasion or power to quarrel with these generally applicable
pronouncements of state policy, we observe that they appear to have appreciably
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How it would be more difficult and what additional matters should be
considered are not clear. The court's conclusion mistakenly presumes,
however, that the interests of the mediator and of mediation are of less
value than that of the parties. The calculus should not change when one
party objects to the disclosure. If the primary interest in preventing the
mediator's testimony is to preserve his or her neutrality, it would seem
that this interest resides more completely with the mediator than with
any of the parties. Certainly, the lessons to be learned from Olam are
applicable whether all the parties waive the privilege or not.
By weighing the interests for and against the mediator's testimony,
the Olam court created a simple "interests of justice" exception to the
mediator privilege. This is similar to the exception that appeared in the
April 16, 1998 Draft of the UMA."' The court, however, was not
burdened with the test in section 6(b) of the UMA, which requires that
the need for the evidence "substantially outweighs the interest in
protecting confidentiality."''
We have no way of knowing if the
decision would have been different had the court been faced with a test
which called for this different measure.' Consider whether the interests
of justice and the probative value of the mediator's testimony, combined
with the rarity of the occurrence, outweigh or substantially outweigh the
policy favoring confidentiality.
Judge Brazil's decision effectively demonstrates the hollowness of
the UMA's requirement that the need for disclosure substantially
outweigh the interests of protecting confidentiality. By thoroughly
analyzing the factors for and against disclosure, Judge Brazil
demonstrated that a mere "weighing" of the need to disclose is
sufficient. The court took seriously its duty to consider all arguments
before ordering disclosure and then did so in a manner which was highly
sensitive to the needs of all, including the mediator.
Further, Judge Brazil, following up on the California Court of
Appeals Decision in Rinaker v. Superior Court,'9 created an interest of
less force when, as here, the parties to the mediation have waived confidentiality
protections, indeed have asked the court to compel the mediator to testify-so that
justice can be done.

Id.
189. APRIL1998 DRAFT, supra note 83, at Reporter's Notes (c)(1)-(10).
190. UMA, supra note 7, § 6(b).
191. This discussion completely disregards the fact that the defenses raised by Ms. Olam,
although sounding in duress as required by the UMA, supra note 7, § 6(b)(2), invoked a statutory
defense based upon undue influence. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1140-92. It is unclear whether this
would have been sufficient to invoke the provisions of the LMA.
192. 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Ct. App. 1998).
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13
justice exception to the mediation privilege where none existed before.
As discussed above,1" the court was faced with two statutory provisions,
one which read in terms of mediator incompetency 95 and the other as an
Neither provision permitted the otherwise
exclusionary rule. 96
applicable exceptions; neither resembled a traditional privilege. For
instance, section 1119 of the California Evidence Code reads in part:
"Except as otherwise provided in this chapter: (a) No evidence of
anything said or any admission made.., in the course of, or pursuant to,
a mediation.., is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of
the evidence shall not be compelled, in any... noncriminal
proceeding.""'
When confronted with what appears to be an
impenetrable barrier, the court interpreted the statute as creating a
qualified privilege. Judge Brazil then created an exception in the
"interests of justice" for contractual misconduct, and determined that
the mediator should be compelled to testify.
Under this provision, how would the hypothetical widow fare in her
lawsuit against the Deceiving Defendant? Does her need for the
mediator's testimony substantially outweigh the interests in protecting
confidentiality? If so, is there anything about the case which can be
generalized to other cases to provide guidance for other disputants and
mediators? If not, does her need merely outweigh, as opposed to
substantially outweigh, the interests in protecting confidentiality? And
how could the balance of the scale be tipped in her favor to show that
her needs satisfy the test in the UMA? Would a better story help?
More heinous conduct on the part of the Deceiving Defendant? A more
heart-rending plight of the widow? Bigger damages? These questions
reinforce the argument that the UMA test is unworkable.
The questions that arise in the case of the Deceiving Defendant also
arise in the case of the Negligent Neutral. Consider the art dealer who
lost the precious Grecian urn and the tax break. Does her need for the
evidence substantially outweigh the UMA's interests in protecting
confidentiality? Why or why not? Plaintiffs should not be denied access
to the court merely because mediators want to avoid the inconvenience

193. Id. at 469 (creating exception for constitutional right to impeachment arising in a
juvenile court proceeding deemed by the court to be a civil action).
194. See supranotes 162-171 and accompanying text.
195. CAL. EviD. CODE § 703.5 (West 1995) ("[No... mediator shall be competent to
testify, in any subsequent civil proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling,
occurring at or in conjunction with the prior proceedings.").

196. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1119 (West Supp. 2001).
197. Id
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of testifying in court. Failure to allow the mediator's testimony will visit
more damage on the institution of mediation than the reverse.
2. The Overwhelming Need
A predictable and consistent interpretation of section 6(b) is further
complicated by language in the Prefatory Note which states: "In
accordance with these state policies, the provisions of the Act should be
applied and construed in such manner as to: [] promote candor of
parties through confidentiality of the mediation process, subject only to
the need for disclosure to accommodate specific and compelling societal
'
interests."198
The Drafting Committees originally had this language in
the text of the UMA, but NCCUSL moved the language to the
Prefatory Note before they adopted the UMA at their 2001 annual
meeting.'9 This prefatory language attempts to frame the UMA's
approach to the tension imbedded within any construction of
confidentiality. On one side of the scale, this language seeks to protect
confidentiality (a broader term meant to encompass both privileges and
keeping secrets)." ° This protection is then weighed against "specific and
compelling societal purposes" for disclosure. The following table
provides a comparison of the introductory language of the September
2001 draft of the UMA with the balancing test contained in section 6(b)
of the NCCUSL approved draft that is being sent to the ABA House of
Delegates for their approval:
198. SEPTEMBER 2001 DRAFr, supra note 11, at Prefatory Note § 1.
199. MAY 2001 DRAFr, supranote 90, § 2(1). The section in its entirety read:
SECTION 2. APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION.
In applying and construing this [Act], consideration must be given to:
(1) the need to promote candor of parties through confidentiality of the mediation
process, subject only to the need for disclosure to accommodate specific and
compelling societal interests;
(2) the policy of fostering prompt, economical, and amicable resolution of disputes
in accordance with the principles of integrity of the mediation process, active party
involement, and informed self-determination by the parties;
(3) the policy that the decision-making authority in the mediation process rests
with the parties; and
(4) the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter
among States that enact it.
Id. Interestingly, the order of the considerations have been changed in this draft of the UMA.
The November 2000 Draft had the first two reversed, with the integrity of the process and selfdetermination consideration listed before the confidentiality provision. NCCUSL, DRAFr UMA
§ 2 (Nov. 2000).
200. See supraPart II.A.
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Against Disclosure
Balancing Test
Favoring
Disclosure

Prefatory Note § 1

§ 6(b) Exceptions to
Privilege

promote candor through
confidentiality of the
mediation process

interest in protecting
confidentiality

subject only

substantially
outweighs
need of party for
evidence

need to accommodate
specific and compelling
societal interests

The factors weighing against disclosure, although worded differently,
both aim at protecting confidentiality. Unfortunately, any similarity
between the two provisions ends here. When considering the factors
favoring disclosure, the Prefatory Note contains a test which is both
stiffer and broader than that found in section 6(b). It requires the
interests to be specific and compelling while also requiring them to be
aimed at wider societal interests. Section 6(b) differs substantially in
that it addresses only the needs of the one seeking the evidence.
Certainly, the need to "accommodate specific and compelling societal
purposes" as found in the Prefatory Note would include "doing
justice, "m'which Judge Brazil, in Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., found

Why is this
to be "an interest of considerable magnitude."'
consideration absent from section 6(b), which deals with privileges,
evidence, and, ultimately, doing justice? Do the drafters intend to limit
the application of broader societal purposes to keeping secrets and not
to privileges? Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius?

The balancing tests between the two provisions are also different.
The Prefatory Note requires a simple balancing while section 6(b) of the
201. Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110,1136 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
202- Id. The court explained that,
Establishing reliably what the facts were is critical to doing justice (here,
justice means this: applying the law correctly to the real historical facts).
It is the fundamental duty of a public court in our society to do justice-to
resolve disputes in accordance with the law when the parties don't.
Confidence in our system of justice as a whole, in our government as a
whole, turns in no small measure on confidence in the courts' ability to do
justice in individual cases. So doing justice in individual cases is an
interest of considerable magnitude.
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NCCUSL approved draft of the UMA, as we have discussed, requires a
"need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in
protecting confidentiality." How are these two tests to be reconciled?
What will a court do when confronted with these two tests? Each side in
a dispute will find some comfort in one of the tests.
The ultimate impact of the tests from these two provisions is by no
means clear. Considered together, they make any determination of
when a privilege should be disallowed that much murkier. These two
provisions will decimate predictability. Using different language in
different parts of the Act referring to the same concept only invites
litigation to sort out these two provisions.
The tests are totally unworkable and will result in two unfortunate
circumstances. First, even if the language receives uniform enactment
by the states, which is doubtful, it will not receive uniform interpretation
by the courts. This defeats the declared intent of the drafters to
"promote uniformity" of the law of mediation.o Second, and more
problematic, this language will adversely impact parties who might
otherwise rightfully litigate their claims of contractual misconduct. The
good cases, the cases where the smoking gun admission will not get to
court, will settle. This language will eliminate most, if not all, borderline
cases. In addition, it may foreclose the somewhat better cases where the
parties are not as well represented and/or financed.
3. Manifest Injustice
An exploration of the short and tragic life of an exception for
manifest injustice may further expose the problems imbedded within the
UMA. One of the earliest drafts of the UMA contained an exception to
This catchall
the mediation privilege for the "interests of justice."'
provision, which transformed an absolute privilege to a qualified
This exception
privilege,20 5 was modeled after an Ohio statute.'

203. MAY 2001 DRAFr, supra note 90, at Prefatory Note § 1.

204. APRIL 1998 DRAFT, supra note 83, at Reporter's Notes (c)(10).
205. Id.
206. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02.3(C) (Anderson 1998). This section, in part, states:
Division (B) of this section does not apply in the following circumstances:
(4) To the disclosure of a mediation communication if a court, after a hearing,
determines that the disclosure... is necessary in the particular case to prevent a
manifest injustice, and that the necessity for disclosure is of a sufficient magnitude to
outweigh the importance of protecting the general requirement of confidentiality in
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disappeared, however, and did not reappear until the Faculty Advisory

Committee urged2 the Drafting Committees in March 1999 to add an
exception "to prevent a manifest injustice of such magnitude as to
outweigh the importance of protecting the... confidentiality in
mediation proceedings. "2j The provision had been transformed from
the "interests of justice" to "manifest injustice" and a test was added
that the need must outweigh the importance of mediation
confidentiality.
The drafters intended the new manifest injustice exception to cover
"exigent, unforeseen, or exceptional"2' 0 circumstances, because the
protections of the Act were to be extended to mediators in a mostly
unregulated profession. 2 ' Further, throughout the drafting process, the
12
Drafting Committees employed a very broad definition of mediation
to include discussions that the public would not want protected, such as
mediations containing important public policy issues.213 Finally,
proponents of the exception asserted that it would provide for reasoned
judicial balancing that would otherwise take place in a vacuum. This

mediation proceedings.
Id. The Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean a "clear or openly unjust
act." Schneider v. Kreiner, 699 N.E.2d 83,86 (Ohio 1998).
207. See supranote 47 and accompanying text.
208. MARCH 1999 DRAFr, supra note 84, § 2(d) Reporter's Working Notes, at Last
Sentence. "The Faculty Advisory Committee urges the Drafting Committee to adopt" a manifest
injustice exception. Id
209. Id. § (3)(d) Reporter's Working Notes § (d)(8) ("There is no protection under
subsections (c):... (8) When the court determines, after a hearing, that disclosure is necessary to
prevent a manifest injustice of such magnitude as to outweigh the importance of protecting the
general requirement of confidentiality in mediation proceedings.").
210. DECEMBER 1999 DRAFr, supra note 85, at Reporter's Working Notes § 2(c)(5) ("The
Drafting Committee decided to continue this modem trend, to give courts the sound discretion to
meet exigent, unforeseen, or exceptional situations requiring individualized consideration.").
211. MARCH 1999 DRAFr, supra note 84, § 2(d) Reporter's Working Notes, at Last
Sentence, ("The exception for 'manifest injustice' seems necessary to take care of unforeseen
problems. This is particularly important because the confidentiality has been extended to
mediators who are neither connected to any public agency nor have been certified or licenced by
any governmental body."); See also Alan Kirtley, Best of Both Worlds: Uniform Mediation
PrivilegeShould Draw from Both Absolute and QualifiedApproaches,5 DISP. RESOL MAG. 5,5

(1998) (recognizing inconsistency among mediation regulations).
212. See UMA, supra note 7, § 2(1) ("'Mediation' means a process in which a mediator
facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary
agreement regarding their dispute.").
213. See DECEMBER 1999 DRAFT, supra note 85, at Reporter's Working Notes § 2(c)(5)
("This exception permits the courts to recognize exceptional situations that have not been fully
anticipated by the Drafting Committee but which would involve such serious injustice that the
need for the evidence outweighs the purposes served by the privilege.").
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was especially important considering that "mediation privileges are
'
relatively new."214

The language of the manifest injustice section

implemented a very high standard for breaching the confidentiality of
mediation.215 The Reporter's Working Notes of July 1999 state: "Given
the fundamental nature of advocacy, the Drafting Committee
anticipates that many if not most such claims of manifest injustice will

fail. 216
To say that the mediation community voiced opposition to the
manifest injustice provision would be a vast understatement.
Opponents of the test considered it unworkable and fraught with
problems. 217 They feared it would open the floodgates of litigation as
each opportunistic lawyer attempted to take advantage of the provision
to pierce the sanctity of the mediation process. Mediation would surely
suffer horrendously if such a provision were enacted. The existence of
this provision quickly became the mediation community's "hill to die
on. 2 8 Through 1999, the opposition continued to mount. To a number,
the mediation organizations acting as Official Observers to the drafting
of the UMA came out in opposition to the provision.1 9 The Executive
Council of the Dispute Resolution Section of the ABA, which is the
sponsoring Section for the ABA Drafting Committee, voted
overwhelmingly to direct the committee to remove the section.' Even

214. Id; see also MARCH 1999 DRAFt, supra note 84, at Reporter's Working Notes § 2(d),
(noting that such an exception, "adds an element.., of judicial balancing, and therefore some
uncertainty in the application of the privilege. Even then, however, the Draft strikes a balance
between competing policies by requiring the proponent of the exception to meet the higher
'manifest injustice' standard of proof").
215. Id.
216. JUNE 1,1999 DRAFr, supra note 130, at Reporter's Working Notes § 2(c)(5).
217. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 92, at 30 ("A privilege applied inconsistently is worse
than no privilege at all.").
218. Memorandum from Richard C. Reuben, Reporter for the ABA Drafting Committee,
to the ABA/NCCUSL Uniform Mediation Act Drafting Committees 3 (October 18, 1999) (on
file with author).
[Manifest Injustice] has been extraordinarily controversial, with most in the
mediation community opposed to the current provision. If the provision remains as
currently drafted, I have serious doubts as to whether the Act would be approved by
the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, and therefore by the ABA House of
Delegates, and whether it would be enacted by the states over the largely uniform
opposition of the mediation community. This provision will be this community's
"hill to die on."
Id.
219. For a list of those observers, see supranote 48.
220. See Memorandum from Richard C. Reuben, Reporter for the ABA Drafting
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with this vociferous opposition, the provision did not suffer a swift and
painless death. Instead, it suffered on, based primarily on the support of
the Chair of the NCCUSL Drafting Committee.'

Believing a consensus

might be generated if the test were made more stringent, the drafters
strengthened the language in the December 1999 Draft:
There is no privilege... (5) if a court determines, after a hearing
with consideration of the mediation communications occurring
only under seal, that the proponent has shown that the evidence
is not otherwise available and there is overwhelming need for
disclosure to present [sic] a manifest injustice of such a

magnitude as to substantially outweigh the importance of
protecting the confidentiality of mediation communications.'m
When this language failed to pass muster during the December 1999
meeting of the Drafting Committees, the Chair formed a task force
(comprised of members of the Drafting Committees and Official
Observers) to explore further alternatives.' The task force sanitized
the language in the January 2000 Draft by removing the buzz words
"manifest injustice," and providing for an exception in "[a]n
Committee, to Friends of the Mediation Law Project (Nov. 16, 1999), available at
http:/wwvw.pon.harvard.edu/uma/revjune99.htm (last visited Sept. 12,2001).
221. See supranote 44.
222. DECEMBER 1999 DRAFT, supra note 85, § 2(c)(5) (emphasis in original to denote
changes in draft language). The Reporter's Working Notes state, "that the privilege should yield
in unusual and exceptional circumstances." Id. at Reporter's Working Notes § 2(c)(5). After
citing the federal Administrative Dispute Resolution Act and several state laws with manifest
injustice-like exceptions, the notes state, "[tihe draft provision is narrower than these existing
statutes." Id. (emphasis in original to denote changes in draft language). The Notes continue:
The Drafting Committee decided to continue this modem trend, to give courts the
sound discretion to meet exigent, unforeseen, or exceptional situations requiring
individualized consideration, and to keep the Act simple and accessible by
eliminating the need for an extensive list of highly detailed exceptions. However, it
adopts a high standard to reflect the Drafting Committee's intent that the
confidentiality protections the Act provides only be lifted by post hoc judicial
determination in narrow and exceptional circumstances, thus preserving the
disputants' reasonable expectations of confidentiality.... Given the fundamental
nature of advocacy, the Drafting Committee anticipates that many if not most such
claims of manifest injustice will fail.
Id The quoted textual material refers to a singular Drafting Committee because the drafts of the
UMA are published by NCCUSL, although the NCCUSL and the ABA Committees are drafting
in tandem. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
223. Memorandum from Nancy H. Rogers and Richard C. Reuben, Uniform Mediation
Act Reporters, to Friends of the Mediation Law Project 1 (December 21, 1999) (on file with
author).
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extraordinary situation not within these enumerated exceptions in which

the general purposes of the state policy favoring mediation
confidentiality is so outweighed by the need for disclosure that the
interests of justice will be served only if disclosure is compelled."2 4
To opponents, the new language was simply manifest injustice under
a different name. "A wolf in sheep's clothing!" they cried.2 This
language limped through the late January 2000 meeting of the Drafting
Committees (in the January 2826 and the January 29 ,2 drafts) and then
finally, ignominiously disappeared when the Drafting Committees voted
it down for the last time.'

The ill-fated manifest injustice exception to

confidentiality presented an unpalatable test for almost all members of
the mediation community. It was a test that provided, in their minds, an
open drawbridge which would inevitably result in hoards of attorneys
swarming over the parapets of mediation and ultimately destroying it.
No matter that the moat might be wide, deep and infested with

alligators, the opponents still saw the exception as an unacceptable
lowering of the gate, which could only lead to ruin.
The opposition of the mediation community to the balancing test
found in the manifest injustice exception is in stark contrast to their
embrace of the "substantially outweighs" test for the mediator

malpractice and contractual misconduct exceptions found in section 6(b)
of the UMA. 29 Not surprisingly, there is a link between the death of
manifest injustice and the rise of the substantial need test in section
6(b). While the supporters of the manifest injustice exception fought a
224. JANUARY 2000 DRAFr, supra note 140, § 2(f)(6).
225. Notes from telephone conference with members of the SPIDR Committee
observing the drafting of the UMA (identity of speaker unknown) (Jan. 20, 2000) (on file
with author).
226. NCCUSL, DRAFT UMA § 2(f)(6) (Jan. 28,2000) [hereinafter JANUARY 28, 2000
DRAFT].
227. NCCUSL, DRAFT UMA § 8(b)(6) (Jan. 29, 2000) [hereinafter JANUARY 29, 2000
DRAFr].
228. One vestigial remnant relating only to criminal misdemeanors appeared in a memo
dated February 12, 2000 suggesting language for the Act, but even this failed to appear on the
draft that went to the next drafting session in Jacksonville, Florida on March 31-April 2, 2000.
Memorandum from Nancy Rogers and Richard Reuben, Uniform Mediation Act Reporters, to
ABA/NCCUSL Drafting Committee Members, ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Council,
Academic Advisory Faculty, Official Observers § 8(b)(3) (Feb. 12, 2000) (on file with author)
(providing for an exception to confidentiality "in criminal misdemeanor proceedings, for those
situations not within these enumerated exceptions in which the general purposes of the state
policy favoring mediation confidentiality is so outweighed by the need for disclosure that the
interests of justice will be served only if disclosure is compelled.") This draft was labeled "Not an
Official Draft," but was still widely distributed.
229. See supra Part IH.A.1.; see also UMA, supra note 7, § 6(b).
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rearguard action by continually strengthening the language, the
exceptions to the privilege for contractual misconduct (although
somewhat narrowed) remained readily available and were not subject to
any test. The December 1999 Draft contained this language:
There is no privilege... nor prohibitionagainstdisclosure...
(5) if a court determines, after a hearing with considerationof the
mediation communications occurring only under seal, that the
proponent has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available
and there is overwhelming need for disclosure to present [sic] a
manifest injustice of such a magnitude as to substantially
outweigh the importance of protecting the confidentiality of
mediation communications;
[(7) to the extent found necessary by a court, arbitrator, or
agency if the disputant files a claim or complaint against a
mediator or mediation program alleging misconduct arisingfrom
the mediation.]
[(8) as to evidence provided by the disputants,to the extent found
necessary by a court, arbitrator,or agency in a proceeding in
which defenses of fraud or duress are raised regarding an
agreement evidenced by a record and reached by the disputants
as the result of the mediation.]
At this point several things must be kept in mind. First, all ten
exceptions to the mediation privilege were placed in one section and, as
indicated by the introductory language, no gateway or balancing tests
restricted access to any exception other then manifest injustice. Second,
the bold face language in the manifest injustice exception was added in
this draft in an attempt to mollify its opponents. The Reporter's Notes
state that the manifest injustice language was drafted more narrowly
than similar state statutes. 31 And, third, the manifest injustice exception
is strikingly similar to the restrictions that eventually restrict access to
the contractual misconduct exception found in section 6(b).' There
must now be an overwhelming need to prevent a manifest injustice
which must substantially outweigh the need to protect confidentiality.
230. DECEMBER 1999 DRAFr, supra note 85, § 2(c) (brackets in original) (emphasis in
original to denote changes in Draft).
231. Id. § 2(c) Reporter's Working Notes § 2(c)(5).
232. UMA, supra note 7, § 6(b).
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The drafters restructured the UMA in the January 2000 Draft and
created a bifurcated system of exceptions. For the first time, the noncontroversial exceptions appear without restrictions 3 and the balancing
test acts as a gateway to the more difficult exceptions:
There

is no privilege ...

if a judicial, administrative,

or

arbitration tribunal finds, after an in camera hearing, that the
disputant seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence has
shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that there is
an overwhelming need for the evidence that substantially
outweighs the importance of the state's policy favoring the
protection of confidentiality and the subject matter of the
disclosure is limited to:
(4) establishing or disproving a claim or complaint of
professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator,
a disputant or a representative of a disputant based on conduct
occurring during a mediation;
(5) A proceeding in which fraud, duress, or incapacity are raised
regarding the validity or enforceability of an agreement
evidenced by a record and reached by the disputants as the result
of a mediation, but only through evidence provided by persons
other than the mediator of the dispute at issue.
[(6) An extraordinary situation not within these enumerated
exceptions in which the general purposes of the state policy
favoring mediation confidentiality is so outweighed by the need
for disclosure that the interests of justice will be served only if
disclosure is compelled.]'

As related earlier, 5 the manifest injustice provision was in its death
throes during the late-January meeting of the Drafting Committees. It
was finally killed before adjournment. However, this was not before the
Drafting Committees engrafted the balancing test onto the contractual
233. JANuARY2000 DRAFT, supra note 140, § 2(e) ("There is no privilege or prohibition...
(1) for a record of an agreement between two or more disputants; (2) for the sessions of a
mediation that must be open to the public under the law.").
234. Id. § 2(f) (brackets in original). Interestingly, when this subsection first appeared, it
was extended to cover three other exceptions: mediation communications relating to threats to
inflict violence, the planning of a crime, and protection of children, disabled adults and the
elderly. Id. § 2(f)(1)-(3). Since these exceptions were obvious and presented little controversy
they were quickly moved to a provision of the UMA without a balancing test and now appear in
section 6(a) of the Act. See UMA, supra note 7, § 6(a)(3)-(4), (7).
235. See supra notes 207-216 and accompanying text.
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misconduct exceptions, among others. This balancing test is the
ancestor of the "substantially outweighs" test which now appears in the
UMA:
There is no privilege ... if a court... finds, after a hearing in

camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the
evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available,
that there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs
the interest in protecting confidentiality.26
Consider the test in section 6(b) which requires a showing that the
need for the information "substantially outweighs the interest in
protecting confidentiality"' with the rejected test dealing with the
manifest injustice test. That test required "an overwhelming need for
disclosure to present [sic] a manifest injustice of such a magnitude as to
substantially outweigh the importance of protecting the confidentiality
of mediation communications."" Both tests are equally unfathomable,
opaque, and incapable of quantification. The interpretation and
implementation of each may have more to do with chance than with any
identifiable or objectifiable standards evident within the language of the
tests.
In the creation of one exception to confidentiality, that of manifest
injustice, a vague and difficult test was rejected. But in the creation of
others, including contractual misconduct, an equally vague and difficult
test was embraced. Why should the idea of a test, which is contemptible
in the creation of one exception, be commendable in the creation of
another? For three reasons.
First, the mediation community, with its huge impact on the creation
of the Uniform Mediation Act, had the political will to get the job done.
The community had the power to destroy the manifest injustice
exception, but not to eliminate exceptions for mediator malpractice or
mediator misconduct.
Second, the manifest injustice exception is much more ephemeral,
The
dealing with "unusual and exceptional circumstances." 9
circumstances which might invoke the manifest injustice exception are
much less concrete than those of contractual misconduct and mediator
236. UMA, supranote 7, § 6(b).
237. Id.
238. DECEMBER 1999 DRAFr, supranote 85, § 2(c)(5).
239. Id. § 2(c)(5) Reporter's Working Notes § 2(c)(5).
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malpractice. If you cannot imagine a horrifying hypothetical, it must not
be a problem. If they cannot be foreseen, why worry about them? The
risk of invoking the section is so remote, the mediation community
should not be endangered by it. Even the supporters found it somewhat
difficult to get in a lather about it.
Conversely, several cases exist which demonstrate the need for
exceptions dealing with contractual misconduct.2" Each mediator can
conjure up frightening hypothetical scenarios which bring more
immediacy to the problem. If one party attempts to defraud or coerce
the other in the course of reaching a mediated settlement agreement,
the parties should be able to litigate or defend the claim without fear
that the rules will limit the ability of one or the other to prove the
offending conduct. 241
In Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc.,242 a 1996 Texas case, the plaintiff brought
an action to enforce a mediated settlement agreement. The respondent
defended the lawsuit by alleging that he had been coerced into a
settlement agreement.2 43 The respondent, after complaining of chest
pains and relating a history of heart trouble, asked for the mediation to
be adjourned.2" Allegedly, the mediators refused to allow him to leave
"until a settlement was reached. "2" The plaintiff moved for summary
judgment by asserting the confidentiality of the proceedings (under the
Texas mediation statute).2' Since the proceedings are meant to be
confidential, the plaintiff asserted that the trial court could not inquire
into the circumstances of the defendant's health and the conduct of the
240. See Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292-CV, 1996 WL 447954, (Tex. App. Aug.
8, 1996); Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re Waller, 573
A.2d 780 (D.C. 1990).
241. See Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-39 (finding that, after both parties waived any
privilege, mediator's separate privilege should give way to the court's needs for the evidence to
decide a party's claim of undue influence in the creation of an agreement reached in mediation).
242. 1996 WL 447954.
243. Id. at *1.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (a) (Vernon Supp. 2001)).
The statute states:
Except as provided by Subsections (c), (d), and (e), a communication relating to the
subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative
dispute resolution procedure, whether before or after the institution of formal
judicial proceedings, is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used
as evidence against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
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mediator.247 In its unpublished decision, the Texas Court of Appeals
breached the confidentiality and reversed the trial court's granting of
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.2' The court reasoned that the
plaintiff could not have it both ways; it could not seek to enforce the
mediation settlement agreement on one hand and then assert the
secrecy of the mediation proceedings on the other.249
In cases of contractual misconduct, the parties and the mediator
should be able to prosecute and defend without the unilateral
imposition of the mediation privilege which would ultimately nullify any
potential claim. When parties assert a mediation privilege to prevent
any inquiry, as Mid Gulf, Inc. did, it is impossible to determine if they
are legitimately protecting the mediator-disputant relationship or
attempting to conceal wrongful conduct that occurred within the
mediation. The malefactors would only need to assert the secrecy of the
mediation process and be shielded from any claim.
As a third reason for rejecting manifest injustice while embracing a
test for contractual misconduct, the mediation community realized that
seeking to eliminate the exception for contractual misconduct would
amount to overreaching and unacceptable favoritism for mediators. It
became apparent that it would be impossible to draft a uniform act
without this exception since the courts with their inherent powers would
create such an exception. Nonetheless, the mediation community
distrusted the court's ability to fairly and consistently interpret these
exceptions. Accordingly, in its effort to preserve the integrity of the
mediation process, the community sought to impose an overwhelming
test upon the courts in an attempt to cabin this problem as much as
possible. The odious test from manifest injustice was suddenly
sweeteningly embraceable to constrict the unavoidable exception of
contractual misconduct. As a result, the mediation community has done
indirectly what it could not do directly. By imposing this difficult test, it
may have eliminated the claims for most disputants damaged by
contractual misconduct.

247. Id.
24& Id.

249. Id.
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B. The ArtificialDistinctionBetween the Exceptionsfor Mediator
Malpractice and ContractualMisconduct
1. We Are All Equal Here, But Mediators Are More Equal Than
Others
There is one distinction between the exceptions for mediator
malpractice"0 and contractual misconducte' which merits further
examination. In a claim against the mediator, the mediator can both
testify and have access to the other parties who did not join in the
complaint against the mediator. The mediator has all the weapons at his
or her disposal to defend against any claim. In a proceeding over
mediator malpractice, the testimony of the other party will hardly be
neutral and unbiased. When such claims are made, the injured party
brings the claim because of a perceived disadvantage resulting from the
mediator's conduct. In such a case, the other party is most likely
advantaged by the acts of the mediator. If the advantaged party is called
to support the mediator's position, his or her testimony will also have
the intended effect of protecting the gains resulting from the mediator's
malpractice. The party aiding the mediator will have a vested interest in
the status quo.
On the other hand, if a claim of contractual misconduct is made,
either party can provide their own testimony and that of any of the
other parties to the mediation to prosecute or defend against attack, but
not that of the mediator.' 2 While a mediator may testify in a proceeding
arising from a complaint of mediator malpractice, none of the parties

250. UMA, supra note 7, § 6(a)(5) ("There is no privilege under Section 4 for a mediation
communication that is: ... (5) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of
professional misconduct or malpractice filed against a mediator.").
251. Id. § 6(b)(2) ("There is no privilege ... if... the mediation communication is sought or
offered in: ... (2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove a claim to
rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the mediation.").
252. Id § 6(b)(2), (c). Section 6 states:
(b) There is no privilege ... if ... the mediation communication is sought or
offered in:
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove a claim
to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the
mediation.
(c) A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation
communication referred to in subsection... (b)(2).
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can call the mediator in an action involving contractual misconduct.
As discussed earlier, Judge Brazil, in Olam v. Congress Mortgage
Co., found the mediator's testimony as the "only source of
presumptively disinterested, neutral evidence."'
Certainly, the mediator has some motivation to want to uphold the
integrity of the mediation, but these pressures are slight in comparison
to those confronting a party. In discussing this point, Judge Brazil
stated:
[A] mediator might have interests or motives that could affect
the accuracy of his or her testimony in a setting like this .... [I]t
is reasonable to assume that at least some mediators want to
perceive themselves as both sensitive and fair-so they would be
unhappy if the court found that they had failed to understand
that a party to the mediation was in acute or disabling emotional
distress at the decisive juncture in the mediation, or was mentally
incompetent to make the kinds of decisions and commitments
the mediator called upon the party to make. Similarly, we should
expect good mediators not to want a court to find that they had
permitted a truly disabled party to sign a contract under duress,
or to execute an agreement whose essentials they did not
understand, or to be unfairly victimized by an obviously more
powerful or sophisticated opponent .... A natural reaction by a
mediator to... claims [of incapacity or undue influence] would
be denial-an assertion that the mediator would never let
something like that happen. Such a defensive reaction could
infect testimony.
The court then measured the mediator's testimony in the case at bar:
The question is not whether [the mediator] might have felt some
of these emotions-the question is whether he permitted any
such emotions to play any meaningful role in how he
I have concluded, after considering all the
testified ....
evidence, that [the mediator] resisted any temptation he might
have felt to defend his work and that he testified carefully and
accurately about what occurred during the mediation."

253. 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
254. Id.at 1127 n.22.
255. Id.
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While not entirely free from pressure that may influence testimony, the
mediator can be the neutral tie breaker. The same can hardly be said
for a party's testimony supporting a mediator in defense of a
malpractice claim.
If Olam was decided under the regime found in section 6(b)(2) and
6(c), " 6 the mediator's testimony would not be allowed no matter how
overwhelming the need might be. Judge Brazil would have been forced
to reject the mediator's testimony even though doing so might prevent
the court from doing justice in the case. When faced with statutory
language that was designed with a similar intent, Judge Brazil
determined that the interests of justice required access to the mediator,
the one person whose testimony was crucial to the outcome of the
dispute. The same results would hold true in the case of the Negligent
Neutral. If sections 6(b)(2) and 6(c)' control, precluding the mediator's
testimony, any lawsuit against the other dealer will likely fail. The
confidentiality afforded the mediation process should not abrogate
common law contract principles and result in the destruction of the selfdetermination of the disputant.
After examining the two provisions, a party who has either been
defrauded or wrongfully accused of fraud is alone in the wilderness and
prevented by the statute from using the mediator to prove his or her
position. On the other hand, were the mediator accused of malpractice,
all the individuals at the mediation table could be called upon to testify
in defense of the mediator's conduct. The natural conclusion is one of
protectionism on behalf of mediators; the well-being of the mediator is
of greater value than that of any of the other parties.
2. The Rule of Unintended Consequences
The combination of sections 6(a)(5) and 6(b)(2) may have some
unnerving and unintended consequences. An astute lawyer, upon
examining these two provisions, will naturally conclude that the
mediator needs to be joined as a co-defendant. If a plaintiff is unable to
depose the mediator in a simple lawsuit against the other party, this
problem can easily be overcome by suing the mediator as well. After
joining the mediator all of the individuals in the mediation, mediator
included, can be deposed. As a result, the mediator will not only have
to worry about getting a protective order to avoid a deposition or trial
testimony, but will also have to hire an attorney and prepare to defend
256. UMA, supra note 7, § 6(b)(2), (c).
257. Id.
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the lawsuit.
This scenario is not far fetched as is demonstrated by a further
examination of the Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc.6 and Olam v. Congress

Mortgage Co.' 9 cases. Both cases involved claims between the parties,
but also either directly or indirectly, implicated mediator misconduct. In
Randle, the plaintiff sued to enforce the settlement agreement and, in
response, the defendant alleged that the mediator coerced him into
staying until the agreement was signed.6
In Olam, the defendant
asserted that she was under duress when the agreement was signed after
midnight' 61 As that mediation progressed, most of the mediation took
place in caucuses with the mediator shuttling back and forth between
parties m Although there were no allegations of mediator misconduct, it
is reasonable to assume that any pressure to settle was at the hands of
the mediator. If either suit had been brought under the terms of section
6(b)(2) of the UMA, the defendants would have been foreclosed from
deposing the mediator in an attempt to prove coercion or distress. The
plaintiff's only recourse, then, would have been to name the mediator as
a co-defendant. This would invoke the provisions of 6(a)(5) dealing
with mediator malpractice and permit the plaintiff to gain access to the
mediator's testimony. As these two cases illustrate, this is more than an
intellectual exercise. If either lawsuit would have been tried under the
provisions of the UMA, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the
mediator would have been defending a personal lawsuit instead of
worrying about seeking a protective order.'
In the cases of the Negligent Neutral and the Deceiving Defendant,
the mediator may end up being named as a party defendant. Certainly,
the disgruntled art dealer may wish to only claim mutual mistake against
the other dealer and hopefully use the mediator as a nonhostile witness.
Regardless of the dealer's motivation and strategy, the unavailability of
the mediator precludes this choice, resulting in the mediator being
joined in the lawsuit.
In the case of the Deceiving Defendant, the mediator cannot testify,
nor can the plaintiff testify about what the mediator said took place
258. No. 14-95-01292-CV, 1996 WL 447954, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 8,1996).
259. Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110.
260. See Randle, 1996 WL 447954, at *1.
261. Clam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1114,1117.
262. Id. at 1142-43.
263. Such a result would create tremendous difficulty for the court to instruct the jury. Is
the jury instructed that the mediator's testimony can only be used as evidence of the claim against
the mediator and not as to the claim against the other party?
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during the caucus with the adjuster. Such testimony would be hearsay.
If the Deceiving Defendant had hatched his plan ahead of time, he
could have taken advantage of the UMA by making any fraudulent
statements to the mediator in caucus outside the presence of the widow.
Section 6(c)2' would insulate him from his bad acts because the
mediator would not be available to testify. This encourages lying and
other contractual misconduct. Beyond creating a bare license to
misbehave, the combination of this section and caucuses may cause the
disgruntled disputant to conclude both that a conspiracy exists between
the mediator and the other party and that the only viable course of
action is to sue them both. Upon final analysis, the plaintiff may not be
able to prevail against the mediator. Nevertheless, this will not prevent
some lawsuits from being filed. The confluence of these forces will only
coarsen mediation and increase the level of mistrust between the parties
which may very well reverse the trend toward early settlement and
reduction of costs. 5
IV.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN CONFLICT

In the overwhelming majority of cases, confidentiality and selfdetermination co-exist and are self supporting. If we assume for a
moment that confidentiality is necessary to promote candor and the
kind of honest and open discussion necessary for mediation to succeed,
then confidentiality must exist to promote self-determination. However,
these two values come into conflict when the parties or the mediator
misbehave during mediation. As Professor Fuller says, they "sacrifice
their own ultimate interests in order to win it."2 This section discusses
the foundation of confidentiality and self-determination and then
analyzes the potential conflict.
A. The Three Foundationsof Confidentiality
The arguments supporting privileges in mediation rest on three main
points. First, confidentiality promotes candor in mediation. Second,
mediation privileges are necessary to protect the mediator's impartiality.
And, third, the parties often have an expectation of privacy which
should be fulfilled by mediation. Although not a part of standard

264. UMA, supra note 7, § 6(c).
265. See, e.g., Barbara McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Does ADR Really Have a Place on the
Lawyer's PhilosophicalMap?, 18 HAMLiNE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 376 (1997).
266. FULLER, supra note2, at 82.
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definitions of mediation 26 7 mediation confidentiality is, proponents
assert, inextricably woven into the very fabric of mediation and is
fundamental to the success of the process.ss The discussions that take

place during mediation often range far beyond the core of the dispute in
order to reveal interests and concerns that may not be discussed during
positional negotiation2 69 or other, more adversarial processes.27 Within
267. See supranote 10.
268. See Kirtley, supra note 100, at 9; Jay Folberg, Confidentiality and Privilege in Divorce
Mediation, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 319 (Jay Folberg & Ann Milne
eds., 1988) ("Assurances of confidentiality and privilege promote openness and foster an
atmosphere of trust necessary for successful mediation."); J. FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR,
MEDIATION: COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 264
(1984); EDWARD A. DAUER, MANUAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR LAW &
PRACTICE § 22.02 (1996); Philip J. Harter, Neither Cop nor Collection Agent Encouraging
Administrative Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality, 41 ADMIN. L. REv. 315, 324
(1989); Cletus C. Hess, Comment, To Disclose or Not to Disclose: The Relationship Between
Confidentiality in Mediation and the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduc 95 DICK. L. REV. 601,
604 (1991); Jonathan M. Hyman, The Model Mediator Confidentiality Rule: A Commentary, 12
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 17, 21 (1988) ("[C]onfidentiality is important to foster the growth of
mediation."); Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 160 ("Maintaining confidentiality is critical to the
dispute resolution process.") (quoting Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral
Reassessment, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL. 25, 29 (citing SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTIONS, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 3 (1986))); Colleen
N. Kotyk, Note, TearingDown the House: Weakening the FoundationofDivorce Mediation Brick
by Brick, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 277, 288 (1997) ("To ensure complete disclosure of
information, parties must be insured that confidentiality will be protected."); Freedman & Prigoff,
supra note 104 ("Confidentiality is vital to mediation."); Jaime Alison Lee & Carl Geisler, Case
Commen Confidentiality in Mediation, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 285 (1998) ("[A] strong
judicial commitment to confidentiality is critical to the success of the mediation process as a
means of dispute resolution."); Pamela A. Kentra, Hearno Evi See no Evil, Speak no Evil The
Intolerable Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation
Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L REV. 715, 722
("Confidentiality lies at the heart of the mediation process. Mediation would not be nearly as
effective if the parties were not assured their discussions would remain private."); Michael A.
Perino, DraftingMediationPrivileges:Lessons from the Civil JusticeReform Ac 26 SETON HALL
L REV. 1, 5 (1995) ("[M]ost experts agree that some form of mediation confidentiality is
necessary .... ) (footnote omitted); Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 441 (1984) ("Confidentiality fosters an atmosphere of trust essential to mediation.").
269. Positional negotiation involves the parties focusing on prices and terms, conceding
slowly, deliberately, and uniformly, and finally compromising in order to reach an agreement. See
ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GE'TING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 3-9 (2d ed. 1991). This bargaining behavior is then contrasted with interest-based
negotiation which focuses on the parties' interests, needs, and motivations, the "why" of a dispute
and not the "what" or "how much." Id. at 10. This latter form of negotiation has been labeled
"principled" by Fisher and Ury. Id. Other commentators have provided us with similarly
dichotomous labels for the ends of the negotiation spectrum. See GERALD WILLIAMS, LEGAL
NEGOTIATION AND SETITLEMENT 48-54 (1983) ("competitive" and "cooperative"); HOWARD
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 33, 131 (1982) ("distributive" and
"integrative"); DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 30-33 (1986) ("value creators" and
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this far-ranging discussion, parties may reveal secrets they might not
otherwise disclose in a normal negotiation. A lack of confidentiality
would squelch discussion and curtail the parties' ability to continue
engaging in creative and interest-based problem solving. This would
greatly impede settlement possibilities. In other words, if the parties
have to be wary of what they say during mediation, both the process and
the resulting outcomes suffer. This limits the efficacy and the efficiency
of mediation.
Second, the success of mediation relies heavily on the duty of the
mediator to remain impartial. 27 The mediator must refrain from
advocating in favor of one party and against others, and must retain the
appearance of facilitating both sides equally. This duty attaches from
the moment the mediation begins and continues throughout the entire
process. No matter how objectively neutral, the mediator's testimony
will not be so construed by the disadvantaged party. This damages the
mediator's impartiality, both in the disputant's eyes and those of
similarly situated parties. It is crucial, the argument concludes, that the
future vitality of mediation depends heavily on creating and enforcing
privileges in order to prevent any adverse impact on the principle of
impartiality.
The first two arguments are bolstered by the final argument. Parties
enter mediation with an expectation of confidentiality. This expectation
may shape their discussions, their joint problem solving abilities, and
their perception of the mediator's impartiality. The mediation should
meet the confidentiality expectations of the parties in order both fulfill
the objectives of mediation and provide for the mediator's continuing
impartiality.
B. The Primary Objective of Mediation
Self-determination of the parties is a principle goal of mediation,m if
"value claimers"); Gary Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and
Behavior,31 U. KAN. L. REV. 69,73 (1982) ("competition" and "collaboration").
270. Kirtley, supra note 100, at 9.
271. See FLA. R. OF CT. 10.070 (West 2001); Family Law Section of the ABA, Standards of
Practicefor Family Mediators, 17 FAM. L.Q. 455, 457 (1984) [hereinafter Standardsfor Family
Mediators].
272. See AFM STANDARDS, supra note 78, at VII Self-Determination (1993); SOCIErY OF
PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, GUIDELINES FOR VOLUNTARY MEDIATION
PROGRAMS INSTITUTED BY AGENCIES CHARGED wiTH ENFORCING WORKPLACE RIGHTS §

H. (1998), available at http://www.spidr.org/work.htm (last visited July 12, 2001) [hereinafter
WORKPLACE GUIDELINES]; FLA. R. OF CT. § 10.020 (d) (West 2001); ALA. CODE OF ETHICS
FOR MEDIATORS § II. (d)(6) (1997), available at http://www.alabar.orgladr/aLcode_ethics.html
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not the primary goal. 2' To affect self-determination, the parties must

make voluntary ' and informed decisions 5 which are based upon full
disclosure. 26 What does it mean to make a voluntary and informed
decision? The Ethical Standards for Mediators from Georgia addressed

self-determination in terms of "complete information.'

"

These

standards posed a hypothetical example to demonstrate the conflict
between self-determination and confidentiality:

A party reveals to the mediator in caucus that he has cancer and
that he does not want his ex-wife to know about it. He is not

sure how long he will be working because of his illness. This
information could be very important to the wife. She may need
to make other plans for the time when that money is not coming
in. Because of the confidentiality, the mediator feels that she

cannot say anything.
Recommendation: This presents the classic dilemma of the
collision between the promise of confidentiality and the need of
(ast visited July 12, 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT., STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR
SUPERIOR COURT MEDIATORS P, 5 (2000). For a broader discussion about self-determination
in court-annexed mediation, see Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determinationin

Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L
REv. 1 (2001).

273. See MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 10, at Introductory Note; ASSOCIATION OF
FAMILY AND CONCILIATION COURTS, MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND
DIvORCE MEDIATION, STANDARD § I. (1998), available at http://www.mediate.com/
articles/afccstds.cfm (last visited July 12, 2001) [hereinafter CONCILIATION COURTS];
CALIFORNIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION COUNCIL, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR CALIFORNIA
MEDIATORS, at Voluntary Participation and Self-Determination (1998), available at
http.//www.cdrc.net/standards.html (last visited July 12, 2001) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA
STANDARDS]; COLORADO COUNCIL OF MEDIATORS AND MEDIATION ORGANIZATIONS,
MEDIATORS REVISED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr, I. Self Determination (1995),
available at http://www.coloradomediation.orgcodeofconducthtm (last visited July 12, 2001)
[hereinafter COLORADO REVISED CODE]; GA. R. OF Cr. ADR APP. C ETHICAL STANDARDS
FOR MEDIATORS § I. Commentary (2000), available at http'J/www.legis.state.ga.us/courts/
adr/appendxc.htm; KAN. Cr. R. & PROC 903(a) (West 2001); S.C. FAM. Cr. R., Std. L (1998);
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF VIRGINIA, STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS, at E. Self Determination (2000), available at
http'/www.courts.state.va.us/text/soe/soe.htm [hereinafter VIRGINIA STANDARDS].
274. See MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 10, § VI. cmt.; WORKPLACE GUIDELINES, supra
note 272, § II.; S.C. FAM. Cr. 1-VI.
275. See FLA. R. OF Cr. § 10310(a) (West 2001) (defining self-determination as both
voluntary and informed); COLORADO REVISED CODE, supra note 273, at I. Self Determination
(defining self-determination as both voluntary and informed).
276. See OREGON MEDIATION ASSOCIATION: DRAFT STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, II.
Informed Consent, VI. Encourage Good Faith Disclosure (2000) [hereinafter OREGON
STANDARDS].
277. GA. IL OF Cr. ADR, APP. C ETHICALSTANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS § 11.
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the parties for complete information if they are to enter into an
agreement voluntarily. The mediator is placed in the position of
keeping a confidence of one party at the expense of the selfdetermination of the other party. If the mediation is terminated,
there is no guarantee that the husband's condition would be
revealed at trial.278
Based upon these definitions, a party is not exercising selfdetermination if they do not have complete information, or at least the
pertinent information in question. Any decision arising from this
situation is neither voluntary or informed. If greater certainty is
required, Florida's Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators
speaks directly to this issue in the Committee Notes:
It is critical that the parties' right to self-determination (a free
and informed choice to agree or not to agree) is preserved during
all phases of mediation. A mediator must not... knowingly
allow a participant to make a decision based on misrepresented
facts or circumstances, or in any other way impair or interfere
with the parties' right of self-determination.
Self-determination, which arises from voluntary and informed
decision-making, represents the cornerstone of all mediation. To this
proposition, there is no debate.
C. When Confidentiality and Self-DeterminationConflict
As we saw in Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc.' there is a downside to
confidentiality when it is used to conceal negligent or intentional
misconduct by either the parties or the mediator. If a malefactor is
successful in using the provisions of confidentiality to conceal wrongful
conduct, the other party will not be making a voluntary and informed
decision, thus destroying the self-determination of the endangered
party. In those cases, the dispute may eventually result in a lawsuit so
that the courts can unravel the matter. It is here that the two principles
face their biggest test. If the mediator had, in fact, coerced Mr. Randle
278. I
279. FLA.R. OF Cr. § 10.310 comm. notes (West 2001) (continuing, the notes state: "While
mediation techniques and practice styles may vary from mediator to mediator and mediation to
mediation, a line is crossed and ethical standards are violated when any conduct of the mediator
serves to compromise the parties' basic right to agree or not to agree.").
280. No. 14-95-01292-CV, 1996 WL 447954, at *1 (Tex. App. Aug. 8,1996).
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to stay in the mediation, the terms of the UMA would have compelled
the court to enforce an agreement that was the antithesis of selfdetermination.
The same holds true for the cases of the Negligent Neutral and the
Deceiving Defendant. Under the provisions of section 6(b)(2) and
6(c), ' the art dealer in the second hypothetical may be unable to prove
the case without the mediator's testimony; accordingly, she will be
denied justice. Aside from the plaintiff's cause of action against the
mediator for negligence, consider whether the confidentiality afforded
the mediation process should be allowed to abrogate the common law
contractual defense of fraud? If so, this would result in the loss of her
lawsuit to set aside the agreement reached in mediation, resulting in the
destruction of her self-determination.
This is pertinent to the case of the Deceiving Defendant, as well,
especially if the adjuster made the misrepresentations to the mediator in
private caucus. Under 6(c),' the mediator cannot testify and the
plaintiff cannot testify about what the mediator said during caucus about
the policy limits because such testimony would be hearsay. This is true
even if the mediator knows the adjuster lied. Should the institution of
mediation condone the adjuster's conduct? Should it condone the
denial of the widow's self-determination?
The reverse of these hypothetical cases also supports this argument.
Claims of fraud, coercion, mistake, or other forms of contractual
misconduct may be unfounded. A disputant should not be able to make
a false accusation and then invoke confidentiality to hide the truth.
Assume that instead of lying about the policy limits, the adjuster
bargains aggressively and the widow accepts the settlement of $102,500.
Later, the widow has buyer's remorse and alleges fraud when the
insurance company seeks to enforce the settlement agreement. Without
the mediator's testimony, there is a greater chance the court will decide
in favor of the widow, thereby denying justice to the company. Olam v.
Congress Mortgage Co.m applies here. Judge Brazil, without the benefit
of hearing what the mediator witnessed, may have found merit to Mrs.
Olam's claims of coercion and rendered a decision that was counter to
the facts.
An examination of two versions of the case of the Deceiving
Defendant will crystallize the dichotomy between self-determination
281. UMA, supranote 7, § 6(b)(2), (c).
282. Id. § 6(c).
283. 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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and confidentiality. In the original version, the adjuster successfully
misrepresents the policy limits and obtains a fraudulent settlement. In
the final version, the mediator glimpses at the adjuster's file and sees the
truth about the insurance policy and rightfully concludes that the
adjuster is lying and is attempting to defraud the plaintiff while the
mediation is still in session. When the mediator uncovers the deceit,
should he or she withdraw from the mediation? Certainly withdrawing
may not stop the parties from reaching an agreement outside the
mediation room, but it will not bear the imprimatur of the mediation
process.
The choice, nonetheless, is clear: if the mediator cannot negate the
attempted fraud, the mediator should terminate the mediation and
refuse to sanction the wrongful conduct. There is a broad spectrum of
guidance on this issue. The Florida Rules for Certified and CourtAppointed Mediators refers to the "Integrity of the Agreement," and
uses familiar principles of contract law: "The mediator shall not
knowingly assist the parties in reaching an agreement which for reasons
such as fraud, duress, overreaching, the absence of bargaining ability or
unconscionability would be unenforceable." ' The Mediator's Revised
Code of Professional Conduct of the Colorado Council of Mediators
and Mediation Organizations states: "If the parties reach an agreement
which the mediator feels is... the result of false information or the
result of bad faith bargaining, the mediator should withdraw or
terminate the mediation."'28 The Standards of Practice for Family
Mediators adopted by the Family Law Section of the ABA require
termination if the "process would harm or prejudice one or more of the
participants." ' As a specific consideration to this mandate, the
284. FLA.R. OF Cr. § 10.110(a)(3) (West 2001); see also KAN. Cr. R. & PROC. 903(0 cmt.
(West 2001) ("A mediator shall withdraw from mediation or postpone a session if the mediation
is being used to further illegal conduct."); N.C. STDS. OF PROF'L CONDUCr FOR MEDIATORS R.
8 (2000). The standard elaborates:
When a mediator discovers an intentional abuse of the process, such as
nondisclosure of material information or fraud, the mediator shall encourage the
abusing party to alter the conduct in question. The mediator is not obligated to
reveal the conduct to the other party... nor to discontinue the mediation, but may
discontinue without violating the obligation of confidentiality.
Id.; S.C. FAM.Cr. R., Std. VI. (1998) ("A mediator shall withdraw from a mediation or postpone
a session if the mediation is being used to further illegal conduct.").
285. COLORADO REVISED CODE, supra note 273, § VI. cmt.
286. Standardsfor Family Mediators, supra note 271, at 458; see also IOWA RULES supra
note 79, at R. 5. ("The mediator [h]as a [d]uty to [s]uspend or [t]erminate [m]ediation [w]henever
[c]ontinuation of the [p]rocess [w]ould [h]arm [olne or [m]ore of the [p]articipants."); OKLA.
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Standards from the Family Law Section state that "[t]he mediator has a
duty to assure a balanced dialogue and must attempt to diffuse any
manipulative.., negotiation techniques utilized by either of the
participants."m Similarly, the Model Standards of Practice for Divorce
and Family Mediators of The Association of Family and Conciliation

Courts requires termination "if a party's conduct indicates that the party
is not participating in the mediation in good faith."M SPIDR's Ethical
Standards of Professional Responsibility, in a section titled: "The
Settlement and its Consequences," requires that "[t]he neutral.., must
be satisfied that agreements in which he or she has participated will not
impugn the integrity of the process."t m Any agreement completed
where the mediator is aware of contractual misconduct would impugn
the integrity of mediation. What would the widow think of the
mediator, and mediation in general, if she learned later that the
mediator knew about the fraud and did nothing? Finally, echoing a
prior discussion, the Virginia Standards require the mediator to
withdraw from a mediation "[u]nder circumstances in which the
mediator believes that manifest injustice would result if the agreement
was signed as drafted." 2"
Some states, although not requiring termination, have raised the
issue and permit the mediator to terminate in these instances. In the
Alabama Code of Ethics for Mediators, "[a] mediator may withdraw if
the mediator believes any agreement reached would be the result of
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, Ch. 37 App. A. § B.l.(e)(1) (West 1993) ("The mediator suspends or

terminates mediation when it appears that continuation would harm or prejudice any party.").
287. Standardsfor Family Mediators,supra note 271, at 459; see also AFM STANDARDS,
supra note 78, at IX. Parties' Ability to Negotiate, Procedural Factors ("The mediator has a duty
to ensure balanced negotiations and should not permit manipulative or intimidating negotiation
techniques."); IOWA RULES, supra note 79, at R. 5(B) ("The Mediator has a duty to assure a
balanced dialogue and must attempt to diffuse any manipulative or intimidating negotiation
techniques utilized by either of the participants."); N.C. STDS. OF PROF'L CONUcr FOR SUP.
Cr. MEDIATORS R. 8 (2000) ("A mediator shall make reasonable efforts to ensure a balanced
discussion and to prevent manipulation or intimidation by either party and to ensure that each
party understands and respects the concerns and position of the other even if they cannot
agree.").
288. See CONCILIATION COURTS, supra note 273, at Standard XII A.5; see also IOWA
RULES, supra note 79, at R. 1. D ("If the mediator or one of the parties is not able or willing to
participate in good faith, then either participant, or the mediator, has the right to suspend or
terminate the process at any time.").
289. SPIDR'S ETICAL STANDARDS, supra note 78, at Responsibilities to the Parties Std. 6;
see also CALIFORNIA STANDARDS, supra note 273, § 3 ("If a [m]ediator believes that... the
integrity of the process has been compromised, then the [m]ediator shall inform the parties and
shall discontinue the mediation, without violating the obligation of confidentiality.").
290. VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 273, at I.
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fraud, duress, overreaching, the absence of bargaining ability, or
unconscionability." 29 Oregon addresses the problem in terms of full
disclosure,2" while North Carolina's has created a catchall standard for
permissive termination:
If, in the mediator's judgment, the integrity of the process has
been compromised by, for example, inability or unwillingness of
a party to participate meaningfully, gross inequality of bargaining
power or ability, gross unfairness resulting from non-disclosure
or fraud by a participant, or other circumstance likely to lead to a
grossly unjust result, the mediator shall inform the parties. The
mediator may choose to discontinue the mediation in such
circumstances but shall not violate the obligation of
confidentiality. 29 3
Now, compare the situation where the mediator discovers the
attempted deception during a caucus to a scenario in which the mediator
remains ignorant of the fraud and only learns of it later when a
subpoena is served. It is inconsistent for a mediator to terminate the
former mediation, but refuse to testify in the latter. If this rule is to
apply, mediators should be instructed to tell disputants, "if one party
tries to defraud the other and we discover it, we will try to help. If we
don't discover it, sorry, but you are on your own in court, because we
won't testify." While mediators are intent upon explaining to the parties
that mediation is a confidential process, should parties also understand
where the rules may fail them? Should they also hear where the rules
will reward the wrongful conduct of others?
Before completing this discussion, it is important to revisit one of the
three foundations of confidentiality, the duty of impartiality. Contrary
to the common wisdom, a refusal to testify in a subsequent lawsuit
represents a betrayal of this duty. When a mediator's impartiality is
threatened, he or she must withdraw." 4 If a mediator discovers
contractual misconduct during the mediation and cannot resolve the
situation, the mediator must withdraw to avoid becoming partial. In
fulfilling the duty of impartiality, a "mediator has an obligation to avoid
an unreasonable result."295
291. ALABAMA CODE OF ETHICS FOR MEDIATORS 3(b) (1995).
292. OREGON STANDARDS, supra note 276, at I.
293. N.C. STDS. OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS R. 5.D (1998).

294. See MODEL STANDARDS, supranote 10, § VI. cmt; FLA. R. OF Cr. 10.070 (West 2001).
295. Standardsfor Family Mediators,supranote 271, at 457.
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V. CONCLUSION

Under the language in the UMA, confidentiality, as a means, is no
longer promoting the ends of self-determination. To the extent that
mediation confidentiality impairs the parties' self-determination, the
mediation privilege should yield to self-determination and to the court's
ability to determine the truth. If the parties access to justice is
hampered, or is so restricted by the UMA as to be virtually non-existent,
any relationship between the results achieved in mediation and selfdetermination will be merely coincidental. This is not acceptable. The
UMA, as currently written and approved by NCCUSL, may
unnecessarily cause the destruction of self-determination in many cases.
The provisions demonstrate favoritism for mediators and may result in
damage to the integrity of the process. Further, the nature of the
provisions restricting the parties access to the exceptions to the privilege
may both increase the number of lawsuits against mediators and also
encourage wrongful behavior on the part of disputants. None of this
will ultimately inure to the benefit of mediation as an institution.
If it is necessary to have a privilege for mediation, certain elements
should be adopted. First, the mediation process is not well served by a
separate privilege for mediators. Second, clear exceptions should be
drafted to cover contractual misconduct. Third, although a procedural
step prior to accessing testimony (such as an in camera hearing or sealed
proceedings) is appropriate, no substantive hurdles should hinder access
to normal common law contract remedies or impair self-determination.
Finally, when challenges arise to an agreement reached in mediation,
the mediator should be treated like all other mediation participants-he
or she should be required to testify. The UMA should not allow the
artificial distinction between the mediator malpractice and the
contractual misconduct exceptions.
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